ETHICAL JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING
Gerald Lebovits,* Alifya V. Curtin,** and Lisa Solomon***

INTRODUCTION
The judiciary’s power comes from its words alone—judges command no army and
control no purse. In a democracy, judges have legitimacy only when their words deserve respect,
and their words deserve respect only when those who utter them are ethical. Opinion writing is
public writing of the highest order. Judges and the opinions they write are held, and must be
held, to high ethical standards. Litigants and the attorneys scrutinize judges and what they write.
So do other judges and the public. People are affected not only by judicial opinions but also by
how they are written. Ethics must constrain every aspect of the judicial opinion.
One way to judge judges is to read their opinions. Although a judge’s role in the
courtroom is a crucial judicial function, only those in the courtroom witness the judge’s conduct.
Most people in the courtroom are concerned with their case alone. Judicial writing expands the
public’s contact with the judge. Writing reflects thinking, proves ability, binds litigants, covers
those similarly situated, and might determine an appeal. What a judge writes enhances
confidence in the judiciary and brings justice to the litigants, or not. The heart of a judge’s
reputation and function rests with the use of the pen.
Judges must resolve controversies. Processes in the courtroom might influence a judge’s
decision, but the written opinion rationalizes issues, explains facts, and settles disputes.1
Opinions open a window into the judge’s mind and show how judges fulfill their duties. They
provide accountability because they are available to the public, the litigants, and higher courts to
read and review.
An opinion’s quality is determined by tone, organization, style, method, and reasoning.
Because opinions offer a glimpse into a judge’s mind, they must be credible, impartial, dignified,
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and temperate. As one scholar explained, “Recognizing the extent to which [judicial] opinions
are subject to scrutiny by the legal community, contributing substantially to legal scholarship,
education, and history, it is crucial that the content of these opinions meet high ethical
standards.”2
To reach these high ethical standards, a judge must ensure accuracy and honesty in
research, facts, and analysis. Opinions must exhibit the qualities of good moral character:
candor, respect, honesty, and professionalism.3 These are not the only considerations in opinion
writing, but they offer excellent direction.
The way an opinion is written can tell the reader as much about a judge as the opinion’s
substance. Sloppy writing shows that the judge put insufficient time into writing the opinion.4 An
opinion that presents a slanted version of the facts or gives short shrift to a seemingly
meritorious argument might suggest that the judge did not explore both sides of an issue.5
Lambasting or lampooning lawyers or litigants might indicate bias.6 An attempt to shoehorn
facts into a particular result when further research might yield a clearer, more convincing, and
different result might show poor reasoning.7 Perhaps most important of all, poorly drafted
opinions “all too often reach the wrong result from an objective, or philosophically neutral, point
of view.”8 Ethical judicial opinion writing inextricably intertwines style and substance.
There is no one right way to write a judicial opinion. This article does not seek to define
the perfect judicial opinion. Rather, this article intends to show how form and substance must
should be laced with ethical considerations. Section I defines the concept of ethics as applied to
judicial opinion writing. Section II explains the function and importance of opinions to the
judiciary and the public. Section III explores the different types of audiences of judicial
opinions. Section IV contains a general discussion of different opinion writing styles commonly
used in judicial opinions. Section V discusses the ethical considerations present in pure opinions,
or highly formalized judicial writings. Section VI explores the ethical considerations present in
impure opinions, or less formal judicial writings. Section VII reviews ethical considerations
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common to pure and impure opinions. Section VIII contains suggestions for writing an ethical
judicial opinion.

I. ETHICS IN THE CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING
Before engaging in a meaningful discussion of what an ethical opinion is, it is necessary
to define the term “ethical.” The dictionary definition of “ethical” is “of or pertaining to morality
or the science of ethics” and “pertaining to morals.”9 The dictionary definition of “moral” is “of
or pertaining to human character or behavior considered as good or bad; of or pertaining to the
distinction between right and wrong, or good and evil, in relation to the actions, volitions, or
character of responsible beings.”10 From the dictionary definition of “ethical,” it is clear that
judges should be of good character: virtuous, righteous, responsible.11 Most would agree that
judges should possess these qualities, but what must a judge do to meet those standards? It is
easy to define extreme misconduct in the negative—like taking bribes in exchange for favorable
rulings. It is difficult to define what moral conduct is in the affirmative. It is just as difficult to
determine what qualities an ethical opinion possesses. It is easy to identify certain kinds of
immoral behavior with respect to writing, such as plagiarism12 or libel,13 but beyond the obvious
are no hard-and-fast rules of what constitutes ethical judicial writing.
To define ethics in the context of opinion writing, one good place to start is the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct.14 Judges and the public use the Model Code (which does not
specifically address judicial opinion writing) as a guide rather than as a set of binding rules. The
Model Code is binding when a specific state adopts all or part of it. The guidelines the Model
Code provides with respect to judicial conduct can be viewed as standards that should be
reflected in judicial writing.
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Canon 1 of the Model Code provides that “[a] judge shall uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary.”15 Subsection A of the same canon explains what upholding
integrity and independence means: “A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and
enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved.”16 The drafters of the Model Code
were aware that to be effective, the judiciary must maintain legitimacy.17 To maintain
legitimacy, judges must live up to the Model Code’s moral standards when writing opinions. If
the public is able to witness or infer from judges’ writing that judges resolve disputes morally,
the public will likewise be confident of their ability to resolve disputes fairly and justly.18
Canon 2 provides that “[a] judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of the judge’s activities.”19 At its basic level, Canon 2 prevents judges from
acting on bias20—including racist or sexist beliefs. Canon 2 also ensures that judges comply with
the law and promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system.21 Canon 2 was
written in general terms to proscribe a broad range of activity.22 The comments to Canon 2
explain that the “test” for the appearance of impropriety is “whether the conduct [at issue] would
create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial
responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and competence is impaired.”23 Canon 2 is designed
to ensure that a judge’s conduct promotes the image of a fair, competent, and impartial judiciary
and to prevent conduct that might tarnish that image. Poor judicial writing will tarnish a judge’s
reputation; it will also sully the reputation of the judiciary as a whole and good government as
well. Judges have an obligation to ensure that their written work reflects the integrity,
impartiality, and competence they are expected to exhibit from the bench. These qualities are as
important as justice and fairness. Without integrity, impartiality, and competence, neither justice
nor fairness is possible.24

15
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16
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17
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Canon 3 prescribes that “[a] judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially
and diligently.”25 The comments to Canon 3 require the judge to be patient and to allow each
litigant to be heard.26 The judge must also give due consideration to the litigants and their claims,
regardless of any initial impulse or thought about the validity of a particular claim. Further,
judges are expected to recuse themselves if they have a personal bias against a litigant or a
litigant’s lawyer.27 In the fight against bias, the best judge is the one who realizes that all people
are biased. That judge “is more likely to make a conscientious effort at impartiality than one who
believes that elevation to the bench makes him at once an organ of infallible logical truth.”28
Thus, “[a]n ethical judge must demand of herself that she identify and understand her own biases
and how they affect her reaction to a case.29
Subsection (B)(4) of Canon 3 is especially pertinent. It provides that “a judge shall be
patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the
judge deals in an official capacity . . . .”30 Canon 3 emphasizes that judges should always act
professionally and respectfully to all. A judge must never patronize or offend the losing side.
The judge must treat all with dignity and respect.
Although the Model Code is seemingly aimed at a judge’s conduct on the bench, it
can—and does—apply equally to a judge’s judicial opinions. A judge’s written opinions cannot
be separated from a judge’s judicial ethics.
Judicial opinions, more than any other part of a judge’s job, influence the public
perception of the judiciary. Public perception of the judiciary is a key concern in the Model
Code.31 From a narrow perspective, a litigant will see from reading the opinion how the judge
reached a decision. From a broad perspective, the public witnesses its rights defined, and to
some extent its rights created or altered, in judicial opinions.32 Much public awareness of judicial
activity is filtered through the lenses of experts interpreting the decision for the public. At the
end of the day, the opinion speaks for itself.

25
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Because judges represent the judiciary to the public and serve as role models in the legal
profession,33 we expect them to live up to high standards, both on and off the bench. Therefore,
there is a societal interest in selecting only the most qualified people with the right temperament
to be judges.
Much of the legal profession revolves around the judiciary: judges resolve disputes,
attorneys seek to settle cases rather than risk an unfavorable result from a judge, and
transactional work is geared toward avoiding the judicial system.34 Lawyers also rely on the rules
of precedent to advise clients and assess risk. As Mortimer Levitan insightfully remarked:
If lawyers ever lose their capacity for believing that precedents enable them to
predict what the courts will do in the future, they would advise their sons to study
dentistry or plumbing or some other respectable and highly remunerative
profession. A lawyer would experience only frustration from his practice if
candor compelled him to advise his client: “The courts held this way last month,
but heaven only knows how they’ll hold next month!” And the bewildered
client—what would he do? Probably seek a lawyer with more illusions or less
candor.”35
The legal community pays close attention to precedent that judges hand down. Precedent steers
lawyers in advising and representing their clients.
Judges occupy a special position in the legal community. They are in a unique position to
influence it. Judges can give momentum to—or stop—trends developing in the legal profession.
A judge’s influence on the legal community is not limited to the lawyers and litigants. A judge is
a professional writer36 who can and should use opinions to influence the legal profession for the
better. One way to improve the profession is to put an end to legalese in judicial opinions. Many
law-journal articles are devoted to translating “legal writing” into plain English for all to
understand.37 Despite this centuries-old38 criticism, little has been done to rectify the situation. If
judges wrote opinions in plain English, it would set a trend in the legal profession toward clearer
writing.

33

Lubet, supra note 6, at 14 (questioning why lawyers should be polite to an abusive judge who insults
and demeans them).
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Another criticism of modern legal practice is the lack of civility among members of the
legal profession.39 A judge who lacks civility on the bench or in an opinion bolsters incivility in
the profession.40 By demonstrating civility on the bench and demanding the same from the
lawyers who appear before them, judges can encourage civility.41 Judges should always be
conscious of their role in the legal world and behave accordingly.
This article does not mean to suggest that the judicial system is rife with unethical judges
who write poor opinions. To the contrary, most judges write hundreds—if not thousands—of
legal opinions in their tenure and do a good job. Given mounting caseloads and time pressures in
the modern-day opinion-writing process, it is impossible and unrealistic to expect every opinion
to be perfect. To create a good opinion, however, ethics must be paramount. No ethical judge
ought ever write an unethical opinion.

II. WHY WRITE OPINIONS?
To write an effective, ethical opinion, the judge must be conscious of the purposes of
opinion writing. To understand these purposes, it is helpful to understand the history of the
American written opinion.
The American legal system was initially a “speech centered” system modeled on the
English system. In the English system, and in most common-law systems, oral argument is the
dominant form of advocacy; the only written item is a short “notice of appeal” giving a one- or
two-sentence synopsis of the issue to be argued.42 In the early American legal system, during the
colonial period,

The American legal system is now a “writing centered”
system in which oral argument is often something the parties must request. Some judges do not
always hear oral argument, and for the most part oral argument, when granted, is limited to a
short duration.
39
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States, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 482, 483 (1994).

43

Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing the Writing-Centered Legal Process,

44

Id. at 1180.

45

Id.

4826-9385-3952.1

7

The shift to a writing-centered system is evident in Marbury v. Madison. The Supreme
Court held that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret
that rule.”46 Most understand Marbury to mean that under the separation of powers doctrine, the
judicial branch interprets laws that the legislative branch enacts and the executive branch
enforces. Marbury means more than that. Marbury requires judges to give reasoned opinions,
not merely judgments, in cases that call for explanation. The judicial opinion is integral to the
function of the American judicial system. Opinions are the vehicles by which the judiciary
elucidates, expounds upon, and creates rights for Americans.
Justice George Rose Smith once pointed to the democratic process as a reason to write
opinions: “Above all else to expose the court’s decision to public scrutiny, to nail it up on the
wall for all to see. In no other way can it be known whether the law needs revision, whether the
court is doing its job, whether a particular judge is competent.”47 Justice Smith recognized that
judges are not untouchable beings. Judges serve their audience. With this service comes the need
for judges to be trusted. Writing opinions makes obtaining this trust easier: it allows a hallowed
institution to become transparent.
Writing judicial opinions essentially serves four functions. First, “opinions are written to
tell the parties why the winner won and the loser lost.”48 The law forbids vigilante, or “self help,”
justice.49 If individuals believe they will receive unexplained outcomes in the judicial forum,
reliance on self-help might become the norm.50
Second, written opinions “constrain arbitrariness.”51 A written opinion explains the
decision to the parties, especially the losing party.52 The losing party must be satisfied that its
arguments have been considered and fairly evaluated. A written opinion also assures the public
that the decision is the product of reasoned judgment and thoughtful analysis, rather than an
arbitrary exercise of judicial authority.53

46

5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

47

Smith, supra note 37, at 200–01.
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Thomas E. Baker, A Review of Corpus Juris Humorous, 24 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 869, 872 (1993) (citing
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 589 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting)); Moses Lasky, Observing
Appellate Opinions from Below the Bench, 49 CAL. L. REV. 831, 838 (1961) [hereinafter “Observing
Appellate Opinions”].
52

Lord Devlin, Judges and Lawmakers, 39 MOD. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1976).
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Third, written opinions ensure correctness.54 Writing an opinion reinforces the judge’s
decision-making process. It forces the judge to evaluate whether the reasoning and the facts
warrant the conclusion reached.55 Many “[m]isconceptions and oversights of fact and law are
discovered in the process of writing.”56 A judge’s writing process must begin early, and a judge
must edit until the deadline. A structured and unrushed writing process in which the judge
organizes thoughts in advance, rewrites, and edits will allow the attorneys, the litigants, and
those unfamiliar with the case to understand the opinion on their first read. If a judge has
difficulty explaining a concept or decision, then more research is required to make everything
understandable. Additional research might unearth other relevant cases or good ideas. A judge
struggling with an opinion must reevaluate all reasoning and accept that a different conclusion
might be reached. Ultimately, judges must always be happy with the result of their writing.
Recognizing this will lead judges to accept responsibility for their opinions and ensure that their
opinions are correct.
Fourth, written opinions are the common law. They encapsulate much of legal discourse.
In our system of stare decisis, courts must look forward and backward to evaluate the bases and
implications of their decisions.57 For appellate opinions of courts of last resort,
the test of the quality of an opinion is the light it casts, outside the four corners of
the particular lawsuit, in guiding the judgment of the hundreds of thousands of
lawyers and government officials who have to deal at first hand with the problems
of everyday life and of the thousands of judges who have to handle the great mass
of the litigation which ultimately develops.58
Opinion writing helps judges structure their decisions as dialogues that consider the common
law’s past and future.59 Additionally, written opinions provide both upward and downward
guidance in the court system. An intermediate appellate court writes to supervise and guide trial
courts. In turn, a jurisdiction’s highest appellate court supervises the intermediate appellate court

54

Baker, supra note 51, at 872.

55

See Mary Kate Kearney, The Propriety of Poetry in Judicial Opinions, 12 WIDENER L. J. 597, 599
(2003) (“Judges write opinions to explain their resolution of a case, to place that case in the context of
past decisions, and to offer precedent for future decisions.” Doing so enables them to “clarify [their]
thoughts as [they are] reduce[d] . . . to paper”); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 48, at 1 (“[T]he
preparation of a written opinion imposes intellectual discipline on the author, requiring the judge to
clarify [the judge’s] reasoning and assess the sufficiency of precedential support.”)
56

Baker, supra note 51, at 873; accord F. Reed Dickerson, Legal Drafting: Writing as Thinking, or, TalkBack from Your Draft and How to Exploit It, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 373 (1978).
57

Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 810, 819
(1961) [hereinafter “Judicial Opinions”].

58

Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARV. L. REV. 84, 96 (1959).
59

See McGowan, supra note 29, at 570 (“Opinions record the life experience of rules.”).
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to bring uniformity to the law.60 Judges must be conscious that their writings will become part of
the common-law doctrine and be relied on by other courts. An unethical opinion has negative
implications that can go beyond the parameters of the individual case for which it was written.

III. THE OPINION’S AUDIENCE
Judges write opinions for different audiences: for professionals, for the public, and for the
litigants in the case.61 A judge must always know when and for whom to write, and when and
how to publish. Unfortunately,
[t]oo often . . . judges write as if only the writer
counted. Too often they write as if to themselves
and as if their only purpose were to provide a
documentary history of having made a judgment.
Instead, they must realize that the purpose of an
opinion is to make a judgment credible to a diverse
audience of readers.62
Judges may write for more than one audience. Judges can write not only for the litigant and the
public but at the same time also for professionals, including lawyers, professors, law students,
and other judges.63 A judge may write the opinion to convince others in the profession that a
certain view of the law and its purpose is correct or incorrect.64
Appellate and trial opinions have different audiences and purposes. Appellate judges
often write opinions to resolve controversies in their jurisdiction or to correct an erroneous trialcourt opinion. For this reason, appellate opinions are mostly directed at the legal profession.
Appellate opinions are also the primary source of material for the casebooks that law students
use to learn the law. Trial judges also write for the legal profession because they ensure that their
opinions survive possible appellate review. In that respect, trial judges must explain their
reasoning fully.
Frequently, trial judges write directly for the litigants, especially when a case involves
settled issues or when a pro se litigant is involved. An opinion is the way judges convey the
judgment of a case. Judgments are primary; opinions merely explain judgments: “judicial
opinions are simply explanations for judgments—essays written by judges explaining why they
recorded the judgment they did.”65 It is important for litigants to understand how and why the
judge reached a particular result. Judges have a duty, running directly to the litigants, to render
legally sound decisions.
60

See Baker, supra note 51, at 873.

61

See Kearney, supra note 55, at 601 (describing “wide audience” that opinions reach).

62

Dwight W. Stevenson, Writing Effective Opinions, 59 JUDICATURE, Oct. 1975, at 134, 134.

63

64

How I Write, supra note 37, at 58.
RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 26 (1990).

65

Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 62 (1993).
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Although the public is not the primary consumer of judicial opinions, judges must keep
the public in mind when writing opinions. This is more important now that opinions are
becoming accessible to the public because of the Internet. The public becomes an audience for
judicial opinions when the decision changes the law or its application. That change, in turn,
changes the way people or entities interact. Journalists are often called on to communicate to the
public the substance of opinions involving issues of public interest.66 Important decisions should
be written so that people can easily understand how their rights are affected.67
The idea that judicial opinions should be accessible to the public is uniquely American.
The English believe that the legal system is accountable mostly to litigants and, therefore, that
the judicial decision-making process should take place in open court—where litigants can hear
the opinion of all the judges. For Americans, accountability in the judicial system stems from the
fully deliberated written judicial opinion. The belief is that the judiciary, as the third branch of
government,68 is accountable to more than the litigants. The judiciary is accountable to the
legislature to interpret and follow the law and to the public to apply the law. The judiciary’s
integrity depends on clear, impartial, and fair opinions. The underlying legal principle of stare
decisis—that courts in the same jurisdiction apply the law in the same manner as higher
courts—means that American judges do not “just write decisions, [they] write precedents.”69
Judges must always bear their audience in mind when writing opinions. Before the
writing process begins, a judge should consider (1) who is the reader of the opinion; (2) what
should the reader do; (3) what speaking voice should be used when writing the opinion; and (4)
what relation should the judge express with the reader —in other words, the decision’s tone.70 As
to the first point, judges must bear in mind who is likely to read their opinions.71 Whether the
opinion is designed for litigants, lawyers, the judiciary, or the public, it is vital for judges to
write with their audience in mind. Second, judges must realize that not everyone will agree with
their opinions. The losing lawyer, the losing litigant, and, in some instances, an appellate court

66

FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 48, at 6.

67

See Nadine J. Wichern, A Court of Clerks, Not of Men: Serving Justice in the Media Age, 49 DEPAUL L.
REV. 621, 667 (1999) (observing that “[g]enerally, judges only speak to the public through their
opinions” and opining that “[t]he primary function of written opinions should be to inform the law’s
consumers”).
68

Judicial accountability and transparency of judicial opinions are fundamental concepts supporting the
idea of the judiciary as a co-equal governmental branch. Smith, supra note 37, at 200–01.

69

Wordsmiths, supra note 1, at 10; accord Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19
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might all disagree.72 Realizing that, judges should write persuasive opinions while presenting the
facts honestly, and perhaps even conceding a point or two to the losing side.73 Third, judges must
choose whether the opinion will be written in a formal pure style74 or in a low impure style.
Fourth, judges must decide on the opinion’s tone.75 Keeping these considerations in mind will
help judges tailor their decisions to reach all who will be affected by what they write.

IV. THE OPINION’S STYLE
For judges, words are critical. Literary style is important to a judge seeking to write an
ethical opinion. If good opinion writing is critical to the good administration of justice, literary
style is critical to good opinion writing. As Robert Leflar wrote,
Some judges argue that literary style has little or nothing to do
with the quality of opinions, that style is “dressing” merely, and
that the functions of opinions are served wholly by their
substantive content. This simply does not make sense. For one
thing, every judge has a writing style, whether he knows it or not. .
. . Whatever it is, it determines how effectively the substantive
content of opinions is conveyed . . . .76
Style and substance are important ingredients in a good opinion.
An opinion that “presents a sound statement of the law will hold its own regardless of its
literary style . . . . But, the fact that substance comes before literary style does not warrant the
conclusion that literary style is not important.”77 Although literary style is important, a
satisfactory “objective is not a literary gem but a useful precedent, and the opinion should be
constructed with good words, not plastered with them.”78 There is not—and should not be—only
one way to write an opinion. As one prominent judge explained, “Once we acknowledge that
there are different ways to [write an opinion], we must also be open to the possibility that there

72

Id. at 922, reprinted in 6 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 115, 124 (1998).
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471, 475 (1939), and in 48 YALE L.J. 489, 493 (1939), and in 39 Colum. L. Rev. 119, 123 (1939)
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[are] better and [] worse way[s] [to write opinions].”79 There are many useful approaches to
writing effective opinions.
Judges must write precisely, simply, and concisely. They must state the rule on which the
decision turns. They must apply law to fact. They should spark interest: “[A] judicial opinion
need not be a dull, stereotyped, colorless recital of facts, issues, propositions, and authorities but
can be good writing and make good reading.”80 Using good grammar and correct usage are also
important in opinion writing. Doing so makes the opinion readable. It sends a message that the
judge took the time to write a grammatically correct and stylistically accurate opinion. It shows
that the judge took the opinion seriously.
Axioms in legal writing include not ending sentences with prepositions, not writing in
passive voice, and avoiding split infinitives. These axioms are tools to enhance one’s writing
style, but should not always be followed.81 And, of course, exceptions often prove the rule: Good
writers will stray from grammatical convention when necessary to enhance the clarity of their
writing.82
A judicial opinion must be more than semantically and grammatically correct. Writing
style is a judge’s signature—the judge’s own imprimatur on the law. The importance of style is
encapsulated in Llewellyn’s aphorism: “Ideals without technique are a mess. But technique
without ideals is a menace.”83 For this reason, judges should shun chameleon writing, which
adopts the winning litigant’s style and changes from case to case. Moses Lasky said it best:
Then there is the opinion manufactured in what Judge
Cardozo, I believe, called the “style agglutinative,” by
scissors and paste pot. In consequence, there are notable
judges whose opinions vary both in style and legal
attainment according to the brief of the party for whom
they have decided to decide; the opinion consists of
reassembled segments clipped from the prevailing briefs.84
Chameleon writing shows no individual thought or reasoning. Judges should not allow their
writing to be a cut-and-paste job. Rather, within the constraints of grammar and ethics, each
judge may express a unique writing style.
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See Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1423
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Judges sometimes use styles foreign to traditional opinion writing. Some have argued
that styles found in popular culture may be utilized in opinion writing.85 Judges have borrowed
from the conventions of poetry, limericks, and even rap to write stylized opinions.86 Although
many judges have tried their hand at using these styles of opinion writing, most fail to write
good law or even good poetry.87
An example of an opinion becoming more famous for its style than its substance is a
much-publicized decision rendered in the Michigan Circuit Court.88 In Mathers v. Bailey, the
plaintiff, a childhood acquaintance of the rapper Marshall Mathers (otherwise known as Eminem
Slim Shady), brought a claim for invasion of privacy and false light for rapping that the plaintiff
had bullied him when they were in middle school together.89 Following a well-reasoned opinion
that explained the facts and the law in connection with Eminem’s summary-judgment motion,
the court granted Eminem’s motion.90 The judge tried her hand at rap by creating thirty-six lines
of lyrics that sounded like the following: “Bailey also admitted he was a bully in youth/Which
makes what Marshall said substantial truth/This doctrine is a defense well known/And renders
Bailey’s case substantially blown.”91 The rap was unnecessary to the court’s decision and served
only to publicize it.92 The decision underscored the point that using poetry or rap as a style in an
opinion undermines the court’s authority. Using these styles turns the opinion into a spectacle
rather than a legal tool.93
The problem with writing an opinion in nontraditional styles is that the judge must fit the
case’s substance into the desired format rather than allow the facts and law to lead the writer and
reader to a logical conclusion that the law supports.94 Sometimes the traditional way is the better
way. Opinions are not the place to experiment with writing styles.
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See, e.g., ALDISERT, supra note 64, at 196.
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See Gerald Lebovits, Poetic Justice: From Bad to Verse, 74 N.Y. ST. B.J., Sept. 2002, at 48, 44
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See id. at *1.
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As articulated by Judge Richard A. Posner, there are essentially two types of
opinions—the pure opinion and the impure opinion.95 The pure opinion is a formal opinion
written with legalese and with a tone of “high professional gravity.”96 Far removed from
conversation, it is often solemn, impersonal, and matter of fact. The judge’s voice is masked
with details, numerous and lengthy quotations from previous judicial opinions, and a serious
tone.97 Although attorneys and other judges might be able to decipher the pure opinion, it is
inaccessible to the average reader.98 By contrast, the impure opinion is conversational and
written in simple, accessible language.99 Judges who write in the impure style not only render
judgment but also explain the decision to the layperson.100 The impure opinion is candid, relaxed,
and sometimes humorous,101 whereas the pure opinion is replete with heavy rhetoric. Adelberto
Jordan explained the pure versus impure dilemma:
Judges may face a dilemma in trying to write
opinions that are figurative, quotable, humorous, or
unique. While they may want to forsake the wooden
form of judicial opinion writing (issue, facts, law,
application, conclusion), they must, in some way,
maintain the dignity and integrity that, at least in
part, gives the judiciary its legitimacy.102
Judges must choose to write pure or impure opinions. This choice is based on the judge’s own
personality or the traditions of the court on which the judge sits. The decision to use the pure or
impure style is also related to the opinion’s intended audience.
Judges who write for other judges (in higher or lower courts), lawyers, and litigants tend
to write in a pure style.103 The judge wants to ensure that the opinion is reasoned, based on
precedent, and authoritative. The pure style is best for lawyers and judges concerned about the
decorum of the judicial opinion.104 The pure opinion originates from Justices Louis Brandeis,
William Brennan, Benjamin Cardozo, Felix Frankfurter, and the second John Harlan. The pure
95

See Judges’ Writing Styles, supra note 79, at 1421.
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Id. at 1426.
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Id. at 1429.

98

See id.

99
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opinion “is characteristic of the vast majority of opinions written by law clerks, which means
most opinions in all American courts today.”105 Indiana Court of Appeals Judge Paul Buchanan
favored the pure approach when he wrote that “[u]sing a structured opinion results in more than
efficiency and readability . . . . The discipline of organizing, dividing, and identifying the parts
of an opinion is a process which, if honestly pursued, necessarily produces brevity, clarity, and
accuracy.”106 Judges writing for the public will write candidly and simply in the impure style.
Impure opinions tend to be fact-based and use almost no legalese. The impure style is best for
the layperson. In an impure opinion, the law is more understandable. Neither style, however, is
free from ethical considerations.

V. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN A PURE OPINION
Purists believe in the solemnity and dignity of the law. A pure opinion reflects that belief.
Purists do not emphasize readability; they write with other goals in mind. A pure opinion
embodies the high, dignified place the judicial system has in American society. Purists use an
impersonal tone, lay out facts and legal propositions in great (sometimes excruciating) detail,
pay much deference to precedent, use technical terms without definition, and scrupulously
comply with citation conventions.107 At its extreme, the pure opinion is written in a lofty and
formalistic tone. Purists organize, divide, and identify the essential elements of a case to provide
accuracy. There are several dangers to writing in the pure style: (1) over-citation; (2) overreliance on authority instead of reasoning; (3) overuse of footnotes; (4) failing to connect facts to
law; (5) using Latinisms; and (6) hiding reasoning behind pretentious language. The pure
opinion sacrifices clarity and readability, and relies on reason in favor of dogmatic, unyielding,
and inflexible rules. At its extreme, the pure opinion is mechanical.
The Opinion’s Length
Some purists believe that a judicial opinion should be a scholarly exposé on the law. Pure
opinions can be lengthy, verbose, and repetitious. A careful and methodical opinion does no
disservice to the law, but it risks alienating the reader. It is probably true that as the length of an
opinion increases, the number of readers decreases. Purists must be conscious not to alienate
readers with their trademark dense writing style and length.
An opinion’s length is often determined by the nature and complexity of the facts and the
issues, by the audience the judge intends to reach, and by the judge’s hopes for publication.108
Judges must account for all these factors in writing their opinions. A memorandum opinion
should not be used when disposing of a case by reversal or remand.109 Litigants, especially losing
litigants, want to be assured that the court considered the issues and engaged in a reasoned and

105

Id. at 1432.
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fair analysis.110 The public wants to be assured that if it relies on the judiciary, then cases will be
decided fairly.111 Judges and lawyers want an opinion to be well-reasoned so that it has some
precedential value.112
The most important factors determining the opinion’s length are “the complexity of the
facts and the nature of the legal issues.”113 These factors determine whether a case requires a
“full dress” opinion, a memorandum opinion, or a summary order.114 Cases that involve issues
about which the controlling law is uncertain, or which contain complex material facts, require
more exposition and analysis than cases involving clear precedents or simple material facts.115
Despite a judge’s desire to write long opinions, opinions must be no longer than they need to be.
Reducing the number of longer opinions might lead judges to write more thoughtful ones. Judge
Bruce M. Selya offered good advice in two law-review articles. Judge Selya proposed that when
it comes to judicial opinions, less is better; judges should write less, but think more.
Two centuries ago, Lord Mansfield lived by the following heroic maxim: “I never
give a judicial opinion upon any point, until I think I am master of every material
argument and authority relative to it.” In these more hectic times, judges are faced
with the choice of either reducing the number of full-dress opinions or lowering
the level of mastery to which they aspire. The better choice is clear. Unless we are
to defenestrate the ideal of Lord Mansfield—and I think we all agree that we
should cling to it—judges must begin to think more and write less.116
I do not pretend that it will be a walk in the park. Despite all the bromides, judges
have fierce pride of authorship—and this pride is, on balance, a good thing. It is
the pride of the craftsman, sticking to his last. To complicate matters, using fewer
citations will make some judges uneasy, worried that either their devotion or their
scholarship will be called into question. Finally, eschewing routine citations will
drive some law clerks to tears. But I think that, if judges can steel themselves to
abjure rote recitations of established legal principles, forgo superfluous citations,
and work consciously toward economies of phrase, the game will prove to be well
worth the candle. With apologies to Robert Browning, the reality is that “less is
more.” If appellate judges do not come to accept and act upon this reality, we will
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simply spend our days writing more and more about less and less for audiences
that are increasingly alienated, or bored, or both.117
Writing should be thorough but economical. In the search for brevity, however, judges should
not be abrupt.118
Judges must strive to be concise: “Brief opinions hold the reader’s attention, allow
readers to move on to other things, and distill the opinion’s essence.”119 Unfortunately, opinions
have been getting longer. For example, between 1960 and 1980, the average length of federal
court of appeals opinions increased from 2863 words to 4020 words; the average number of
footnotes increased from 3.8 to 7; and the average number of citations rose from 12.4 to 24.7.120
Long opinions can cloud issues, obscure facts, and cause the reader to become disinterested or
confused.
The Dangers of Lengthy Opinions
Lengthy opinions can be dangerous blueprints for impressionable law students. An
opinion’s primary target is the public, but the public rarely reads judicial opinions. Law students
are the ones likely to read famous appellate opinions. Judicial opinions are the building blocks
on which future lawyers model their legal-writing skills. If judges write in a particular way, then
students will take their cues from that style in crafting their own writing: “For better or worse,
the opinion affects the basic writing pattern of the profession.”121 Appellate opinions are the
main source of educational material in casebooks that law professors use to teach the next
generation of lawyers. The majority of the public’s exposure to legal opinions is filtered by legal
experts, for example, by a lawyer explaining the outcome of a case to a client or by a legal
correspondent on the news explaining what happened in Bush v. Gore.
The first time that lawyers-to-be read opinions is during their first year of law school.
Law schools teach students to “think like lawyers,” a way of thinking different from the way
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most people think.122 Because law students must learn a new way of thinking, they seek
examples of what it means to think, speak, and write like a lawyer. From the first day of class,
law students are exposed to definitive opinions that have shaped the law. Those opinions may
not be the perfect style or framework for writing judicial opinions. Students often receive a
distorted view of how a lengthy opinion is actually written and how the case is decided
substantively. Textbook editors pare down long opinions in casebooks, thereby distorting
students’ perceptions of the case and how the law operates.123
Ironically, the use of judicial opinions in legal education by the casebook method might
contribute to the lengthening of opinions. In their indirect role as educators, judges realize that it
is incumbent on them to explain fully their decision-making process. Judges may also believe
that the public’s increased participation in the law warrants a complete explanation of a decision.
Concerns about transparency and accountability to the public may lead judges to over-explain
their reasoning, making for longer decisions.
Longer opinions also do a disservice to practicing lawyers. Lawyers today, who must
stay abreast of legal developments in their field, are subject to enormous time pressures.
Lawyers have little luxury to study opinions. The increase in opinion length124 makes it less
likely that a lawyer will thoroughly examine the pertinent case law or be able to extrapolate an
opinion’s pertinent issues, holdings, and nuances.
The public can also be affected by an opinion’s length. Litigants will feel dissatisfied
with a court’s ruling if they cannot understand its reasoning. The possibility that an opinion’s
length might alienate the public reinforces a perception of law and of the judiciary as something
unattainable, unusable, out of a layperson’s reach and comprehension. This result is something
the judiciary should avoid.125
A lengthy decision might suggest excessive reliance on a law clerk’s work.126 As Judge
Ruggero J. Aldisert cautioned, “When I see an opinion heavily overwritten, it is a signal to me
that it is the product not of a judge, but of a law clerk, a person who is generally not
sophisticated or perhaps confident enough to separate that which is important from what is
merely interesting.”127 A judge should be wary of the implications that lengthy opinions can
have.
Shortening Opinions
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Eliminating dicta is one way to shorten an opinion. Dicta—often added to placate, or
even impress, the opinion’s audience—distracts the reader from the issues.128 Although some
doctrines have arisen from dicta,129 it is not the way to develop legal precedent. A judicial
opinion should resolve only the pertinent controversy and not discuss superfluous matters.130
Dicta should be limited because it has the potential to obscure holdings, make incorrect
predictions, pressure officials in other branches of government, and “overexplain” the case.131
Dicta is an even bigger concern for appellate judges, whose opinions are binding legal precedent.
Dicta can also lead trial judges to interpret appellate decisions erroneously.132
Judges can shorten their opinions by using fewer string citations. Unless there is reason
to show the number of cases concurring with a particular rule, it is unnecessary to cite numerous
cases that stand for the same proposition, especially when all the cases cited hail from the same
court. Most times a judge need cite only the seminal, the most recent, or the most on-point,
controlling pronouncement.133 That other circuits, districts, or divisions follow the same
precedent might be interesting, but absent further reason—such as noting a conflict of
authority—noncontrolling precedent should be deleted from the opinion. Not only does
eliminating unnecessary citations shorten the opinion, but it also increases the opinion’s clarity
by eliminating potentially confusing and irrelevant citations. The exception is that “if an opinion
breaks new ground . . . the court should marshal existing authority and analyze the evolution of
the law sufficiently to support the new rule.”134
Similarly, opinion length can be controlled by limiting what has been stated in earlier
case law. The rules from the cases, not the cases themselves, should be emphasized. Overreliance on authority spells a purist approach to the law: cases matter more than the reasoning in
those cases; distinctions among cases are ignored; and reasoning is hidden by long, dull
discussions of authority. Those who rely excessively on authority tend to discuss factual
minutiae in paragraph upon paragraph, resulting in disorganized opinions.
Unless the weight of the authority is important, the better approach in the pure opinion is
to cite cases for their rules and to discuss the facts of cases only to distinguish or analogize them
128
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to the facts of the case under consideration.135 In our common-law democracy, judges must
follow binding precedent and legal rules of statutory interpretation. But not all precedents are
binding, and not all statutes can be interpreted at face value. As Illinois Chief Justice Walter
Schaefer explained, “lawyers tend to treat all judicial opinions as currency of equal value . . . .
Yet, when the judicial process is viewed from the inside, nothing is clearer than that all decisions
are not of equivalent value to the court which renders them.”136 Professor John Henry Merryman
noted the problem a half-century ago when he wrote that
[b]y emphasizing “the law” to the exclusion of “the legal process,”
by perpetuating the illusion that all there is to decision of a case is
location of the appropriate rule . . . these works perpetuate an
unsophisticated concept of the legal process in which the actual
bases of decision are concealed not only from the society he serves
but from the judge who decides.
A first step in freeing himself from this view of law is that the
judge recognize that headnotes from previous decisions, no matter
how carefully arranged, how accurately copied, how smoothly run
together into text, no matter how carefully weighed, distilled and
condensed into higher abstractions, do not of themselves decide
cases . . . . [Judges should] ignore the false front of mechanical
jurisprudence . . . . 137
Judicial writing is more complicated than merely citing cases and reciting facts.
Judges should also carefully select the facts they incorporate in an opinion. A judge must
include all relevant facts. If the judge, consciously or not, believes that relating “the full relevant
truth about a case would weaken the convincingness of a decision [the judge] want[s] to deliver,
[the judge] ought to question that decision with soul-searching cogitation.”138 An under-inclusive
presentation of the facts might suggest that the decision is poorly reasoned. This is especially
relevant for trial judges because appellate reversals are often based on a trial judge’s erroneous
interpretation of the law. Rarely are cases reversed because the trial judge has presented the facts
inaccurately.139 Although an opinion must contain all relevant facts—omitting relevant facts is
always worse than including too many facts—the opinion should omit all irrelevant facts.140
135
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Including too many facts makes an opinion unnecessarily dense and less readable. When
presenting the facts, judges should strike a balance between including all relevant facts and
eliminating unnecessary, peripheral facts.141
Controlling sentence structure and grammar also helps shorten an opinion. Long
sentences with multiple propositions should be broken into two or three separate sentences.
There are several benefits to explaining a point in one or two short sentences instead of one long,
confusing sentence. A clearly written sentence eliminates the need to repeat or re-explain a point
in different words. A reader will have an easier and faster time reading two or three clear
sentences once, rather than reading one complicated sentence two or three times. Clear sentences
keep the opinion flowing, make it understandable, and allow the reader to get through the entire
text of the opinion quickly.
In striving for concision and succinctness, judges should recall their role in molding the
common law. When drafting an opinion that lays down a new rule of law or modifies an old one,
a judge should keep in mind the opinion’s impact as precedent.142 The opinion “should present
sufficient facts to define for other readers the precedent it creates and to delineate its
boundaries.”143 It should also contain a sufficient analysis of the precedents and relevant policies
to establish the rationale for the holding.144 An opinion that fulfills these roles without verbosity
is the proper length, regardless of raw word count.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s opinion in the companion cases of Herbert v. Shanley
Company and John Church Company v. Hilliard Hotel Company is both succinct and wellreasoned.145 The cases concerned whether the petitioner in a copyright dispute was entitled to
royalties for free performances of the petitioner’s music. Justice Holmes decided the case in a
few paragraphs. The first two state the facts and procedural history. In the third and final
paragraph, he issued his ruling: “If the rights under the copyright are infringed only by a
performance where money is taken at the door, they are very imperfectly protected.”146 Justice
Holmes used the remainder of the paragraph to expand on the holding. We do not suggest that all
opinions use this Holmesian brevity,147 but much can be said for an opinion that is brief and on-
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point. Even though short, comprehensive opinions are harder and more time-consuming to write,
they are easier to read. In a legal system plagued by lengthy pleadings and verbose orators, “less
can be more when the goal is elucidation and persuasion.”148
Legalese
Plain expression is necessary for a legal system extensively based on judicial review.149
Legalese has no place in judicial opinions. Justice George Rose Smith defined legalese as “a
word or phrase that a lawyer might use in drafting a contract or a pleading but would not use in
conversation with his wife.”150 A pure opinion is easily identified by its legalese. There are two
criticisms of legalese: “its style is strange, and it cannot be understood.”151
Legalese has been criticized since Shakespeare’s day,152 yet it is still common in today’s
judicial opinions. Using legalese contributes to a pure opinion’s high style. It is axiomatic that all
legal writing responds substantively and stylistically to the “language of the law.”153 Legalese is
the language of lawyers, containing words that do not often appear outside the legal profession.
Some legalese is necessary, having become terms of art over years of development.154 But most
legalese is unnecessary.155
The law is riddled with legal terms of art necessary to the practice of law. A term of art is
defined as a “short expression that (a) conveys a fairly well-agreed meaning, and (b) saves the
many words that would otherwise be needed to convey that meaning.”156 Words like “plaintiff,”
“hearsay,” and “felony” are terms of art;157 they have distinct meanings a synonym cannot
replace. Even though a word frequently appears in litigation documents, that does not mean it is
untranslatable. For example, “inter alia” should be replaced with “among other things,” and
“among other things” is itself often a verbose phrase.
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Judges often use phrases from dead or foreign languages. It is said that Latin is a dead
language still alive in legal writing, including judicial opinions. The average person has no
concept of Latinism (except perhaps e pluribus unum), but judges regularly include phrases like
“lex loci delecti” or “malum prohibitum.” Latin and legalese make an opinion prohibitive to the
public. These phrases invariably force most readers to look up the phrase—or possibly just stop
reading the opinion altogether. French is another language commonly used in opinions. Common
French phrases include “vis-à-vis,” “cestui qui trust,” or “dehors the record.” The English
translations of these words should be used instead.
Judges must translate legalese into language comprehensible for those not trained in the
law. Judges should control the use of the law’s “professional dialect”158 and compose
comprehensible opinions. Perhaps the purists believe their audience consists of only those who
understand legalese—judges and lawyers. But legalese segregates a whole other audience: the
public. If the public cannot understand an opinion because of the legalese, then the public cannot
understand the law’s ongoing evolution or, worse, the grounds on which cases are decided.
Using language that is difficult to understand diminishes the public’s perception of judicial
integrity and alienates a public that cannot gauge whether a decision is fair.
Proponents of legalese argue that using legal terms of art ensures that the opinion’s plain
language will be interpreted in the manner intended.159 They also maintain that legalese ensures
that a term will be interpreted in the same way in the future as it has been in the past. Further,
they contend that legalese is understood by those in the legal profession, is designed to keep
people out of court, and gives litigants the best chance of winning if they do wind up in court.160
If legalese were as precise as some claim, then it would be unlikely that litigation would
turn on the meaning of a word or a phrase.161 Litigation that turns on the meaning of a word or
phrase in a contract or a judicial precedent might have been avoided had plain English been
used.162 Words carry no special meaning beyond their plain-English counterparts.
Why, then, do judges continue to use legalese? One theory is that judges, as
professionals, enjoy having power over others; they use legalese to dominate others.163 Another
theory is that a judge’s ability to use language not readily understandable to the rest of society
allows the judge to maintain social status—only those select few can interpret and understand
what is said.164 Yet another theory is that legalese is a cover for lazy writing and helps
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overburdened judges. When trying to get a point across, it is easier to fill a document with
complex phrases than to pare down complicated language into plain English.165
It is more time-consuming and difficult to write an accurate and effective opinion
understandable to laypersons than one that is unintelligible. But if opinions are to be accessible,
the burden is on judges to take the time to make them so. The Chief Judge of New York, Judith
S. Kaye, has written about the commitment judges must make to writing readable opinions:
First, we need to make sure that our communications are
accessible. For sitting judges, this starts with sensitive courtroom
behavior and speaking clearly—in English, not in Latin, not in
French, and not in pettifog . . . . We need to say what we mean in a
way that people can understand.166
Instead of using a phrase from a dead or foreign language, judges should write in plain English.
On an ethical level, legalese hides. Purist judges obscure their thinking by using the
inherently unclear language of legalisms. Legalese is imprecise and often muddles lawyers as
much as it does lay people.167 Judges should use clear, precise words to reveal rather than hide
their thinking.
Focused Writing
The importance and function of judicial opinions underscores the need for opinions to be
focused. Some pure opinions contain not only facts and relevant law but also unnecessary
discussions.
Focused writing is not rushed writing. Although a court should decide no more than it
must, “sometimes courts extend this ‘law’ to the point of deciding no more than is necessary to
get the case off the desk.” As a result, “the court’s opinion slithers out through some pinhole,
and the case goes back for further anguished and expensive litigation.”168
Judges must render just and reasoned decisions. Some judges treat an opinion as an
opportunity to write a brilliant essay on the legal topic presented in the case. But opinions are not
the place to write scholarly exposés. As noted by Professor Richard B. Cappalli, opinions should
favor pedestrian virtues:
Rhetoric need not be utilized for its power of persuasion because, right or wrong,
the precedent binds. The appellate court’s primary duty is to reason and write
clearly and succinctly, with constant vigilance against future misreadings and
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distortions. This duty can be executed quite well with pedestrian English and only
mildly sophisticated reasoning.169
Opinions should not be written primarily to be cited or to be incorporated in law-school
casebooks—even though an opinion will create law if it is memorable. Regardless whether a
judge is cognizant that a certain decision will be published because of the novel issues or facts or
the political importance of the case,170 the opinion should always be edited, scrutinized, and
polished.
A judge must also be careful not to stray into politics when writing an opinion. The
decision should focus only on the issue before the court and not what the legislature should not
do, or discuss political realities outside the actual case. An example of that is found in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.171 At the end of his concurrence, Justice
Harry Blackmun, who believed that a woman’s right to choose is afforded constitutional
protection, wrote, “I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step down, the
confirmation process for my successor well may focus on the issues before us today. That, I
regret, may be exactly where the choice between the two worlds will be made.”172 Justice
Blackmun’s observation was poignant, and arguably correct, but his discussion did not belong in
the opinion.
Opinions are not law-review articles, historical treatises, or op-ed pieces. Some opinions
require additional commentary, such as opinions involving a technical subject or groundbreaking
new law. Still, commentaries on broader political and social policies or “better” examples of
statutes that the legislature should have written are not always proper. Policy-oriented dicta are
inappropriate. This dicta oversteps the court’s role as an interpreter of laws and bullies
legislatures or agencies into adopting judicially approved laws. They also suggest to the reader
that the case was decided on a social or political agenda and not on the facts and the law. Judges,
particularly the purists, must focus their opinions on the issue squarely before the court. Judges
should prefer “lean and tight” opinions rather than opinions that exercise in “show and tell.”173
Language Choices
Because purists rely strongly on formalism, their word choices can result in unnecessarily
complicated opinions.174 For example, a writer’s “voice” can either clarify the facts or make
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them murky. Passive voice can also make an opinion murky. Single passives invert a sentence’s
order. Double passives hide the actor or the sentence’s subject. Compare the double passive “the
defendant’s motion was denied erroneously” with the active “the trial court erroneously denied
the defendant’s motion.” The former leaves the reader wondering who was wrong in denying the
motion. Common sense tells practitioners it was a court, but only the second sentence makes it
clear to all readers who did what to whom.
The use of nominalizations can further obscure the law to laypeople. Nominalizations,
which turn verbs into nouns, fail to give the reader enough information. Compare “an instance of
the commission of torture appeared on the record” with “upon examining the record, we find that
the police officer tortured the prisoner.” Avoiding nominalizations helps judges write clearly.
Subject complements also impair a reader’s understanding of an opinion. Subject
complements appear after the verb “to be” and after linking verbs like “to appear” and “to
become.” For example, “angry” is the subject complement of “the judge became angry.” This
language choice is deceptive because the reader does not know what made the judge angry.
The unnecessary use of flowery language (also known as “ten-dollar words”) obscures the
law to laypeople and impairs comprehension even by judges and lawyers. Judge Bruce M. Selya
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is famous175 for using in his decisions what he calls
“neglected”176 words—including, for example, sockdolager,177 algid,178 longiloquent,179 and
decurtate.180 Read this introduction from one of his opinions and see whether if you understand it:
This matter arises on an infrastructure of important concerns involving the
prophylaxis to be accorded to attorneys’ work product and the scope of trial
judges’ authority to confront case management exigencies in complex multidistrict litigation.181
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This opinion goes on to make the reader’s job difficult, and to make the reader feel dumb, by
using “armamentarium,” “auxetic,” “etiology,” “interdicts,” “interposition,” “maladroit,”
“neoteric,” “quadripartite,” “tenebrous,” and “transmogrification.”182 The judge even used the
phrase “abecedarian verity”183—meaning “basic truth”—to make his readers’ comprehension as
unabecedarian as possible.
Judges who wish to demonstrate the breadth and depth of their vocabulary by peppering
their opinions with words that send the reader rushing for the nearest unabridged dictionary
would be better advised to exercise their intellect with crossword puzzles and competitive
Scrabble.
Passives, nominalizations, subject complements, and flowery language conceal reasoning.
Well-written opinions leave no mandate vague. Judges should use language that increases the
reader’s ability to understand the court’s reasoning and its consequences, not language that leaves
the reader uncertain and doubtful.
Plagiarism
Extensive reliance on legal authority marks a pure opinion. Using lots of legal authority is
not unethical: the authority an opinion cites bolsters its legitimacy. But judges—especially
purists, who use numerous sources in their opinions—must be wary of the fine line between
citation and plagiarism. Judicial plagiarism occurs when judges write opinions that use material
from copyrighted sources, such as law reviews, but neglect to credit their sources.184 Plagiarism is
literary theft and is regarded in certain fields, most notably academia and journalism, as
unethical.185 To violate copyright law, the new work must “substant[ially]” incorporate
copyrighted material.186 Because of the nature of opinion writing, in which different concepts
from different sources must be combined to form the opinion, it is unlikely that judges will use
source material substantial enough to violate copyright laws. At most, judicial plagiarism takes
place when judges use a few sentences from a source and fail to credit the source. Judges must be
cautious of using copyrighted sources, including case headnotes, which are not binding authority
and should not be cited.187
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Courts have uniformly condemned plagiarism, regardless whether the culprits are
students, lawyers, doctors, or professors.188 Even a judge who plagiarized a law-review article was
condemned for his actions.189 A court held that the judge violated the Model Code, even though
the Code does not address plagiarism, because the judge’s actions “erode[d] public confidence in
the judiciary.”190 Plagiarism in judicial opinions detracts directly from the legitimacy of the
judge’s ruling and indirectly from the judiciary’s legitimacy.
Although judges must cite sources, the line becomes blurred when the issue is plagiarism
from legal briefs that litigants submit. An argument exists that “lifting” language from a public
document filed with the court should be permitted because legal documents are not copyrighted
material. The argument further goes that the litigants want the court to adopt their language and
reasoning. The contrary argument is that to preserve the appearance of neutrality, judges should
compose opinions using their own language and reasoning so that the litigants can see that the
court considered the arguments and had its own thoughts. This article does not suggest that purist
judges are more likely—inadvertently or not—to plagiarize. Rather, it is more of a consideration
for purists than for impure writers because purists tend to cite more legal authority than impurists.
Reliance on Quotations
One way to limit the possibility of plagiarism is to limit reliance on quotations. Limited
use of quotations is relevant for the purist opinion writers, who can overuse them for the same
reasons they might overly rely on authority: to mask independent thought and evade
responsibility for their decisions. Quotations should be relevant and short.191 The reader wants to
know what the judge thinks, how the judge analyzed the cases, and how the judge weighed the
facts. Quotations hinder judges from writing what they think. Judges should “[q]uote [only]
essentials, memorable sound bites, succinct things others have said better than [they] can,
authoritative sources, and anything in dispute.”192 Other than those limited uses of quotations,
judges should expunge all others from their opinions.
When judges limit their use and length of quotations, quotations can be helpful.
Quotations help prove that the argument is reliable and that the reader need not consult the source
of the information to confirm the reliability of the statements made. Quotations are sometimes
more authoritative, especially when the words come from a higher court, than a paraphrased
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statement.193 But too many quotations detract from the opinion’s authoritativeness. Overusing
quotations reveals a writer’s lack of analysis.
Sources for quotations should also be reliable and lend weight to the opinion. An
individual a judge chooses to quote must be reputed to be “principled, intelligent, sincere, and
knowledgeable.”194 Conversely, judges should refrain from quoting obscure sources. The reader
will then be left questioning the source and the judge’s reasons for using it.
To ensure that quotations are not ignored, judges should integrate a quotation into the
writing with a sentence before it to introduce the quotation and a sentence following it to explain
the quotation or to place it in context. When used properly, quotations can add authority and
connect to precedents. When used improperly, quotations make the opinion confusing, make it
seem as though the judge did not consider the issues, and make the reader ignore the quotation.
Metadiscourse
Purists should guard against verbiage, especially metadiscourse. Metadiscourse is “clichédriven discourse about discourse.”195 Metadiscoursive writers inform their audience about what
they are writing when they should simply get to the point. Infamous phrases include “as a matter
of fact,” “bear in mind that,” “I would venture to suggest that,” “it can be said that,” or “it goes
without saying that.”196 Metadiscourse takes up space and adds nothing to a judicial opinion.
Metadiscourse also detracts from the opinion’s authoritativeness. Compare “It is hornbook law that government actors may not discriminate on the basis of race” with “Government
actors may not discriminate on the basis of race.” The latter sentence is direct. The former is
muted by the throat-clearing phrase at the beginning. The American Bar Association condemned
overwrought and overstated metadiscourse in a report written mostly by Ninth Circuit Judge (and
previously Washington Supreme Court Chief Justice) Frederick G. Hamley:
Avoid expressions such as “a cursory examination is sufficient” or “this
point need not long detain us.” The losing lawyer will feel the examination has
been too cursory and that the court should have detained itself a little longer. The
phrase “no citation of authority is needed” is redundant. If the citation of authority
is not needed the informed reader will know it. But where this expression is used
many will suspect that a citation was really needed but could not be found.197
Opinions should be quiet. Judges should be confident that the opinion’s meaning and relevance
are powerful without needing any introductory phrase.
Metadiscourse can further convey the wrong message. Judges often use metadiscourse to
show their audience that they have carefully considered the issue by using phrases like “a
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thorough review of the record,” “a complete review,” or “a careful review.” One would hope that
all decisions are considered carefully so that there would be no need to highlight that the judge
thought about the case. Highlighting metadiscourse has a negative effect. It sounds “hollow,
contrived, and overly defensive—and at best “readers may find them offputting.”198
Instead of talking about how they analyzed the facts, judges should present relevant facts
candidly. Instead of talking about how they researched the law extensively, judges should discuss
the law extensively. Instead of relaying how carefully they considered the issues, judges should
analyze the law thoroughly.199
Doctrines and Maxims
A pure opinion’s formalism dramatically increases when the court relies on maxims or
doctrines without the reasoning to explain them. By their nature, maxims are too vague or broadly
drawn to be applied practicably in all cases. In 1887, Lord Esher wrote that “maxims are almost
invariably misleading: they are for the most part so large and general in their language that they
always include something which really is not intended to be included in them.”200 Even though
some of our greatest jurists have written maxims, judges should avoid relying on them
reflexively.
A maxim is “a self-evident proposition assumed as a premise in mathematical or
dialectical reasoning . . . [or] a pithily-worded [proposition], expressing a general truth drawn
from science, law, or experience.”201 Judge Cardozo created a lasting legal maxim in Wagner v.
International Railway Company when he wrote that “danger invites rescue.”202 In Wagner, two
cousins were riding on a train traveling over a trestle. One cousin was thrown from the train
through the doors that the train company’s employees left open. The second cousin walked across
the trestle to find the body of his cousin and fell in the darkness and injured himself. The trial
court’s jury charge allowed the jury to find that the defendant would be negligent only if the
plaintiff was acting on the defendant’s specific instructions when he left the train to rescue his
cousin. Thus, unless the defendant ordered the plaintiff to leave the train, the plaintiff’s voluntary
act of rescue broke the chain of causation. The jury found for the defendant, and the New York
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant’s original negligence in causing the first
cousin to fall out sustained a finding of negligence toward the second cousin. The court found it
reasonably foreseeable that someone might try to rescue the victim of the defendant’s negligence
because “danger invites rescue.”203 Judge Cardozo found that the act of choosing to rescue
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another is not enough to break the chain of causation of the defendant’s original negligence
toward the rescuer placed in peril.204
Judge Cardozo acknowledged the dangers of using maxims when he warned against “the
extension of a maxim or a definition with relentless disregard of consequences.”205 By
understanding the context of the maxim “danger invites rescue,” we can understand what the
maxim means. A person who negligently places another in danger is liable for injuries caused to
rescuers because it is foreseeable, and socially desirable, that someone might attempt to rescue
the person in peril. If the maxim is taken in the abstract—without explaining the reasoning behind
it—it is impossible to understand how to apply the maxim properly.
A maxim is meaningless as precedent unless it is explained. The same is true about
blindly applying a doctrine. Doctrine is defined as “that which is taught; instruction; a body of
teaching.”206 The difference between a doctrine and a maxim is that a doctrine is a general
statement of the law, to which there might or might not be an exception. Ethical considerations
for doctrines differ from ethical considerations for maxims. Judges must be sure they understand
the maxim and use it in the appropriate context. A doctrine, by contrast, is a free-standing general
principle of law. Judges must be sure to use doctrines appropriately. A doctrine can be misused if
the judge is not diligent in finding exceptions. To be ethical, a judge must determine whether
using a general doctrine is appropriate and whether any exceptions exist.
Justice Holmes wrote in Lochner v. New York that “[g]eneral propositions do not decide
concrete cases.”207 In Lochner, the Court considered state law that forbade bakers from working
more than forty hours a week.208 Lochner was a baker who worked sixty hours a week.209 The
New York Court of Appeals found that New York had the authority to pass a law protecting
workers.210 In reversing, the United States Supreme Court relied on a doctrine that provides that
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the absolute freedom to
contract unless a state passes a valid law under its police powers.211 The Court defined “police
powers” narrowly and limited the concept to laws that prohibit using contracts to engage in
unlawful or immoral behavior, including protecting the health or safety of contracting parties.212
The Court found insufficient grounds for the police power to trump the right to enter into
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contracts freely because other laws existed and ensured that bakers had sanitary workplaces.213
Justice Holmes found the majority’s analysis inadequate. In his dissent, he cited other examples
in which the Court found a valid exercise of police power in similar circumstances.214 Justice
Holmes argued that the Court should look to the individual circumstances of the case instead of
simply relying on general doctrine.215
Justices Cardozo and Holmes recognized the ethical danger in relying on maxims and
legal doctrines to resolve issues, rather than discussing their underlying reasoning. Judges,
especially the purists, should follow their reasoning: they should cite maxims and generalized
doctrines only if they also explain the background and use them in context.

VI. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN AN IMPURE OPINION
The author of an impure opinion believes that the law should be practical and that an
opinion should be accessible. The impure opinion is conversational and candid, flowing not in
any rigid, structuralized format but in an explorative format. An impure opinion’s content
depends on what the impure writer believes a layperson would consider important.
Grammar
An impure opinion is marked by an informal tone. An impure judge must not, however,
dispense with basic writing principles and conventions to write an accessible opinion. It is
undeniable that “[a] careless comma, a stray phrase, [or] a fanciful footnote”216 can change the
opinion and its principles. Given the nuances and complexities of language, a judge must ensure
that an opinion conveys intended meaning and that it does not take on a new meaning when future
litigants dissect it.217 Judges must be wary not only of simple sentences being too broad and of
short sentences narrowing the scope of a rule. They must also be aware of the possible
interpretations of the opinion and should correct it for vagueness. An opinion open to different
interpretations because of poor grammar is unacceptable if the result is unintended. It would be
intellectually dishonest if opinions were left intentionally vague.
Personal Embellishments
Although impure opinions are not constrained by legalese, over-reliance on precedents, or
rigid organization, impurists are likely to embellish their writing with their personal style.
Personal embellishments are an enjoyable part of writing: “Few things are more pleasurable in
opinion-writing (opinion-reading as well) than encountering exactly the right phrase that perfectly
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encapsulates both the case holding and the larger principle.”218 The right phrase becomes eternal
and almost as recognizable as the opinion itself.219
The desire for recognition is not foreign to the judiciary. Many judges write opinions not
only to apply the law correctly but also to be remembered for it.220 A judge can establish a
reputation for personal embellishments. Judges Richard A. Posner, Alex Kozinski, and Samuel B.
Kent come to mind. Judge Posner is the presiding godfather of American celebrity judges because
of his prodigious writing talents and his melding of law with economic theory.221 Judge Kozinski
has gained fans for his memorable opinions and for his writings on topics like video games and
snowboarding.222 Judge Kozinski is so popular that an unofficial Web site is devoted to his
writings.223 Judge Kent’s comical decisions have found fans, and detractors, in lawyers, who email them to one another.224
Republic of Bolivia v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc.225 is a favorite opinion of Judge Kent’s fans
and a good example of his humor. In Bolivia, Judge Kent transferred a case the government of
Bolivia had originally brought in Brazoria County, Texas, to the federal district court in
Washington, D.C.
The Court seriously doubts whether Brazoria County has ever seen
a live Bolivian . . . even on the Discovery Channel. Though only
here by removal, this humble Court by the sea is certainly flattered
by what must be the worldwide renown of rural Texas courts for
dispensing justice with unparalleled fairness and alacrity,
apparently in common discussion even on the mountain peaks of
Bolivia!226
Judge Kent’s personal embellishments did nothing more than showcase his attempt at humor.
Not every case presents the opportunity or need to provide an encapsulating quotation.
Style is amorphous and constantly changing, but danger arises in constructing “immortal

218

Id. at 11.

219

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844 (“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”).

220

See Jenny B. Davis, The Limelight Rules: Some Celebrity Judges Can’t Help Getting Big Heaps of
Attention, 88 A.B.A. J., Apr. 2002, at 28, 28.
221

See id.

222

See id. at 29.

223

See http://notabug.com/kozinski (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).

224

See Davis, supra note 220, at 28.

225

39 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (S.D. Tex. 1999).

226

Id. at 1009 (ellipses in original).

4826-9385-3952.1

34

phrases.”227 Phrases that once resonated with generations may “stick[] in the throat” of future
readers.228
For example, in explaining the applicability of the bespeaks-caution doctrine in a
securities action,229 one court noted that “[t]he doctrine of bespeak caution provides no protection
to someone who warns his hiking companion to walk slowly because there might be a ditch ahead
when he knows with near certainty that the Grand Canyon lies one foot away.”230 This quotation
emphasizes that the bespeaks-caution doctrine does not protect issuers if the situation against
which the issuer warned is certain to occur and if the warning is insufficient to allow an investor
to make a fully informed decision about the investment. Although the quotation may be humorous
to a securities or corporate lawyer, to a layperson—or even a practitioner of another type of
law—the quotation is a confusing description of a legal concept that could have been described
better in simple, non-allegorical terms.
Improper personal embellishments, which usually take the form of catch-phrases and
melodrama, do not belong in opinions. Despite a desire to make an opinion more accessible by
crafting a catch-phrase that encapsulates a legal rule, the opinion’s ruling or its main point is best
summarized by a theme rather than a catchy phrase. Furthermore, melodrama in opinion writing
is maddening.231
Humor
Humor in the judicial system is not funny. In a judicial opinion, “[l]ightening wit is
typically unenlightening. A judicial opinion demands propriety and professionalism.”232
The root of the word “humor” is “humus,” which means to bring low, to the ground.233
Although some pure opinions evince flashes of humor, humor is more common in impure
opinions. When a judge uses humor in an opinion, the lawyer or litigant can do little but accept or
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appeal the decision.234 A lawyer or litigant has no opportunity to respond to what is said in an
opinion: it is the final word in the case.235 Even if lawyers or litigants could respond, it is doubtful
that they would, given the power judges hold in the courtroom.236 Professor Prosser felt strongly
about avoiding judicial humor: “[T]he bench is not an appropriate place for unseemly levity. The
litigant has vital interests at stake. His entire future, or even his life, may be trembling in the
balance, and the robed buffoon who makes merry at his expense should be choked with his own
wig.”237
Litigants, who consciously place the court in a position of power to resolve controversies,
expect to be treated fairly and with dignity. Humor can defy both those expectations. When
litigants or lawyers are the subjects of judicial humor, they may feel that the judge did not take
the case seriously or consider the issues in the case thoroughly. The court is in a position of power
over the litigant, who has a serious personal stake in the litigation, and judges should not use their
position to bring the litigant down.238 It is undignified for judges to use their power to make fun of
or humiliate litigants.
Humor does nothing to advance the opinion’s reasoning or the force of the law, and those
the court attacks may feel the sting for years to come.239 Litigants seek both justice and sensitivity
from the court.240 If one accepts the proposition that it is an act of aggression for a judge to direct
biting humor at a litigant or an attorney, it is easy to see why humor is offensive. It is not a fair
fight: The judge gets to have the first and last word on the matter.241 The subject of the judge’s
ridicule has no recourse but to accept the joke and the accompanying humiliation.242 As Justice
Smith wrote, “For a judge to take advantage of his criticism-insulated, retaliation-proof position
to display his wit is contemptible, like hitting a man when he’s down.”243 Judges must be careful
to ensure that their style is not offensive and does not make light of the important task they must
fulfill.
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Some opponents of judicial humor have gone so far as to suggest amending the Code of
Judicial Conduct to proscribe judicial humor as inappropriate.244 Barring such an amendment,
courts have taken to censuring judges who inappropriately use humor. In one decision, the
Supreme Court of Kansas publicly censured a state trial judge for writing a demeaning opinion in
rhyme in a criminal case.245
Supporters of humor in judicial opinions argue that it helps demystify the law.246 They
believe that humor “help[s] crystallize a point, put it in context, and breathe life into the set of
facts that the law has formalized.”247 For example, in Donelon v. New Orleans Terminal
Company, Judge Irving Goldberg used humor to explain why the plaintiffs could not pursue state
court remedies248:
Appellants themselves issued the invitations to dance in the federal ballroom, they
chose their dancing partners, and at their own request they were assigned a federal
judge as their choreographer. Now that the dance is over, appellants find
themselves unhappy with the judging of the contest. They urge us to reverse and
declare that “Good Night Ladies” should have played without the partial summary
judgment having been granted and without the preliminary injunction having been
issued. This we have declined to do, and in so doing we note that this is not The
Last Tango for the Parish. Appellants still have an encore to perform and their day
in court is not yet over.
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Although humor might succeed in rare instances, more often it is a crutch: “writing can be made
lively, forceful and interesting by clarity and rhetoric.”249
Another argument favoring humor is that judges can show a lighter side of the law and
humanize a case.250 And some judges argue that humor “adds life to the otherwise rigid format of
judicial opinions”251—a reason a judge might choose to write in an impure style. Some impurists
view the law as aggrandizing disputes with legalese. They believe that humor helps reshape the
decision, makes it understandable, and keeps it simple.
Most of the time, litigants come to court in their personal capacities to resolve intensely
personal matters. Sometimes, however, powerful entities, like large corporations or government
agencies, come before the court. Some suggest that when entities use their power to take
advantage of others or act inappropriately, the use of humor may be appropriate.252 They argue
that using humor to redress abuses of power adds an exclamation point to the court’s
admonishment and increases the likelihood that similar abusive conduct will be avoided in the
future.253
Various commentators explain that no binding rule applies to humor in opinions. Rather, it
can be used in certain circumstances. As Justice Cardozo stated: “In all this I would not convey
the thought that an opinion is the worse for being lightened by a smile. I am merely preaching
caution.”254
Carving out instances when humor is appropriate only exacerbates the problem. If humor
is to be part of an opinion at all, it must not dominate the opinion. That is, “[t]he humor must be
brief.”255 But the potential for harm means that the safest course is to eliminate humor from
judicial opinions. All litigants deserve to be treated with respect. An impure opinion is already
written comprehensibly; the need to use humor to make the opinion more readable and
understandable becomes academic. Humor only reduces the authority of the opinion and the
judge. Expressing this same view, Justice George H. Carley wrote a special concurrence to
distance himself from a majority opinion of Georgia Court of Appeals:
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I cannot join the majority opinion because I do not believe that humor has a place
in an opinion which resolves legal issues affecting the rights, obligations, and, in
this case, the liberty of citizens. The case certainly is not funny to the litigants. I
concur in the judgment only.256
Litigation is not funny. Humor serves no purpose in an opinion meant to create legal precedent and reflect
reasoned judgment.257 Serious opinions and humorous opinions are not separate and distinct: they
are different manifestations of style.
Poetic Opinions
Judges should not construct opinions in the form of poems.258 Although “[p]oetic justice is
always entertaining,”259 it is “rarely poetic or just.”260 Poetic opinions undermine the key aspect
that is central to judicial opinions—they lack “a clearly articulated holding supported by
precedent.”261 Litigants, especially the losing side, may feel as though the court treated their
issues and arguments frivolously.262 And the public will conclude that the court spent more time
constructing the verses than contemplating the law.263 As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
observed, “The law is not the place for the artist or poet. The law is the calling of thinkers.”264
Judges should spend more time contemplating the law than creating verses.
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Poetry also produces bad law because legal analysis is shortchanged for rhyme.265 Readers
are likely to assume that the judge is more concerned about the rhyme than reaching the just
result. Indeed, “the appearance of impropriety makes it inappropriate for judges to use verse in
their opinions.”266
Despite the problems with using the judicial opinion as a creative writing platform,
numerous opinions have been written in rhyme. One New York City Criminal Court judge
penned an opinion mimicking Clement Clarke Moore’s “A Visit From St. Nicholas”:
‘Twas Game Six of the Series when out of the sky,
Flew Sergio’s parachute, a Met banner held high.
His goal was to spur our home team to success,
Burst Beantown’s balloon claiming Sox were the best.
The fans and the players cheered all they did see,
But not everyone present reacted with glee.
“Reckless endangerment!” the D.A. spoke stern.
“I recommend jail—there’s a lesson he’d learn!”
Though the act proved harmless, on the field he didn’t belong
His trespass was sheer folly, and undeniably wrong.
But jail’s not the answer in a case of this sort,
To balance the equities is the job of this court.
So a week before Christmas, here in the court,
I sentence defendant for interrupting a sport.
Community service, and a fine you will pay.
Happy holiday to all, and to all a good day.267
The opinion is witty. But its summary of events is more suitable for a magazine.
Poetic opinions sometimes hold no punches in insulting the litigants, even the winning
litigants. In United States v. David Irving,268 a federal district judge set aside a defendant’s
conviction for taking off his wet clothes in a nearly deserted parking lot because the magistrate
judge failed to record the proceedings. The defendant’s attorney included the following verse in
his papers. The district judge incorporated the verse in his opinion, but it provided little solace to
the defendant:
There was a defendant named Rex
With a minuscule organ for sex.
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When jailed for exposure
He said with composure,
De minimis non curat lex.269
Parties seeking justice should not become fodder for entertainment in the hands of a judge who
would reduce the parties to caricatures.
Those who support, or perhaps merely tolerate, poetic opinions argue that those opinions
capture the reader’s attention.270 Similarly, some say that the public might be more likely to read
poetic opinions because they find them more accessible.271 It has also been asserted that writing a
poetic opinion requires a judge to be succinct and distill the analysis.272 One benefit to a poetic
opinion is that “[t]he subject of the opinion may lend itself to a light touch.”273
Those who are opposed to opinions believe that poetic opinions run the risk of trivializing
a grave subject.274 The poetic opinion might grab a reader’s attention, but it will be the verse
rather than the opinion’s substance that will get the most attention.275 The Kansas Supreme Court
looked at whether a magistrate judge violated the Model Code by writing an opinion in verse
explaining his decision to place a prostitute on probation for soliciting an undercover police
officer.276 The opinion began:
This is the saga of _ _
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Whose ancient profession brings her before us.
On January 30th, 1974,
This lass agreed to work as a whore. Her great mistake, as was to unfold,
Was the enticing of a cop named Harold.277
The court concluded that although the magistrate had the discretion to pen the opinion as a poem,
he was not permitted to hold “out [the] litigant to public ridicule or scorn.”278 The court warned
that “[j]udicial humor is neither judicial nor humorous.”279 Poetic opinions are “verbal
narcissism”280 that isolate litigants, are based on limited reasoning, and do not dispense justice.
Poems have no place in judicial opinions.
Respect
More lamentable than humor or poetic opinions is scorn. Impurists need to ensure that
through their informal tone, their opinions do not degrade or insult litigants. According to a
number of observers, there has been a general “decline of civility in the courts.”281 As role models
for lawyers, judges should not contribute to that lack of civility.282
A judge’s use of scorn suggests that bias might have motivated the judge.283 If a judge
describes a claim as inane or a lawyer as inept, the reader will wonder whether the judge was too
distrustful to pay close attention to the litigants’ arguments.284
Further, an opinion that makes clear what the court thinks about a particular lawyer will
affect the lawyer’s ability to advocate effectively the next time the lawyer appears before the
authoring judge.285 A lawyer might pull punches, especially about a unique or novel argument, for
fear that the judge will regard the argument as “asinine” or “idiotic.”286 Also, once a lawyer has
been scorned in an opinion, the question arises whether the lawyer will be taken seriously in
future cases.287 The same holds true for lawyers who have not yet come before a judge with a
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reputation for humiliating litigants and lawyers. They, too, might be reluctant to advance novel
arguments for fear of becoming objects of the judge’s scorn.
Respecting litigants appearing before the court seems to be self-evident. But even the
Supreme Court is guilty of breaching this rule.288 Two historical cases aptly illustrate the Court’s
use of caustic language against litigants. The first is Plessy v. Ferguson.289 In Plessy, the Court
upheld a state provision that required black passengers to ride in “black only” cars, thereby
affirming the “separate but equal” treatment of African-Americans.290 The plaintiffs argued that
separating passengers by race degraded them and violated their rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.291 Dismissing this argument, Justice Henry Billings
Brown noted that if African-Americans found the railroad’s treatment offensive, it was “solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”292 A second example is Buck v.
Bell.293 Justice Holmes in that case upheld an order to sterilize a woman asserted to be mentally
retarded and the mother of a child who was also mentally retarded.294 Justice Holmes’s infamous
comment can be found in the conclusion of his curt opinion, in which he remarked that, “three
generations of imbeciles are enough.”295
Unfortunately, these cases have not dissuaded the Court from continuing to degrade
litigants on occasion.296 In United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,297 Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, in his dissent, objected to the majority’s detailed history of the Sioux Nation to
explain why the Sioux were entitled to compensation for their land.298 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
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described the Sioux as historically skilled in warfare, robbing, killing, and “‘inflict[ing] cruelty
without a qualm.’”299 His description had nothing to do with the Sioux Nation’s claim. His
description served only to bolster his point that the Sioux did not come to the table with “clean
hands.”300
Rather than attacking the lawyers or litigants directly, some judges attack claims using
terms like “‘absurd’ and ‘unsubstantiated, self-serving, contradictory, and inconsistent’ to explain
their decision.”301 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reprimanded one plaintiff for
bringing a “patently meritless” case and warned the plaintiff that similar, repeated conduct may
warrant “the ultimate denial of access to the judicial system absent specific prior court
approval.”302 Although the court’s language might have been justified in that case, the public in
reading only the decision and not considering the reasoning behind it will view the judiciary
unfavorably. The public will see the judiciary as unnecessarily harsh. The Fifth Circuit could
have reached the same result by stating that “in light of the time and resources the court and
defense attorneys expended in connection with plaintiff’s claims, which have no legal basis, the
court dismisses the case and orders that the plaintiff use the judicial system only with specific
court approval.”
Sarcasm, a form of ridicule, also has no place in opinion writing.303 Judges should refrain
from using sarcasm to attack litigants, whether directly or—by mocking their
claims—indirectly.304 Even amici authors are part of the judicial process and should be not be the
subject of disrespect.305 Although some scholars argue that mockery can be appropriate when
directed at powerful figures and government entities,306 it is always prudent and judicious to give
all litigants the same respect.
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Judges must be careful to treat distraught litigants, including mentally challenged or even
delusional litigants, with respect.307 Delusional litigants are, regrettably, common enough that
law-review articles have been written about them.308 The issue for the opinion writer—recalling
that how a judge writes counts as much ethically as what a judge decides—is how to resolve these
claims. Below are some examples of how opinion writers have treated delusional claims:
• After discussing Stephen Vincent Benét’s classic short story “The Devil and
Daniel Webster,” the court considered whether it has jurisdiction over the
defendant, Satan.309
• A persecuted cyborg-woman sued Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton,
and others, for 5.6 billion dollars.310 She claimed that the defendants reinstituted
slavery, played loud rock music, and used airplanes and helicopters to strafe her
dorm room. In an extensive opinion, the court dismissed the suit, respectfully but
firmly.
A judge should treat the court system and the litigants with dignity. In doing so, the judge
will gain the readers’ trust and assure them that all litigants will be treated equally.
Unless a case is about attorney misconduct, judges should also refrain from using their
opinions to discipline or chide attorneys. Taking the time to point out annoying or unprofessional
behavior detracts from the opinion’s force and undermines it by devoting part of the opinion to
irrelevant facts. A famous example is Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, Inc., in
which the Delaware Supreme Court publicly chastised an attorney for directing some colorful
language toward opposing counsel during a deposition.311 The court included a transcript of the
offending comments and concluded that it was powerless to discipline an attorney not admitted to
the Delaware bar. The court stated that it would instead ban the attorney from appearing in
Delaware in the future if he did not explain his behavior within thirty days of the issuance of the
opinion.312 The court believed it had a duty to create a degree of professional courtesy. The
reprimand served only to distract from the court’s resolution of the controversy.
Another scathing opinion is Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corporation.313 Judge Kent began
by attacking the defendant’s brief:
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Before proceeding further, the Court notes that this case involves two extremely
likable lawyers, who have together delivered some of the most amateurish
pleadings ever to cross the hallowed causeway into Galveston, an effort which
leads the Court to surmise but one plausible explanation. Both attorneys have
obviously entered into a secret pact—complete with hats, handshakes and cryptic
words—to draft their pleadings entirely in crayon on the back sides of gravystained paper place mats, in the hope that the Court would be so charmed by their
child-like efforts that their utter dearth of legal authorities in their briefing would
go unnoticed. Whatever actually occurred, the Court is now faced with the
daunting task of deciphering their submissions.314
Judge Kent then moved on to attack the plaintiff’s counsel:
The Court commends Plaintiff for his vastly improved choice of crayon—Brick
Red is much easier on the eyes than Goldenrod, and stands out much better amidst
the mustard splotched about Plaintiff’s briefing. But at the end of the day, even if
you put a calico dress on it and call it Florence, a pig is still a pig.315
Judge Kent’s derision of the lawyers detracted from his resolution of the case. He was seemingly
so frustrated by the quality of the lawyers’ work that he gave the appearance of deciding the case
begrudgingly. Instead of using a different way to let the lawyers know what he thought of them
(like ordering them to rewrite their briefs316), he opted to attack them. His decision to use the
opinion to deliver a harsh reprimand brings into question whether he decided the case fairly.317
Another example of the judiciary’s scolding of attorneys occurred in 1996 when Presiding
Judge Daniel P. Anderson of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals wrote a concurring opinion only “to
lament the untimely demise of common courtesy in the legal profession.”318 The judge pointed
out that an attorney’s failure to warn opposing counsel that a default judgment would result was
an “example of the hostile environment that is the leading cause of the collapse of common
courtesy.”319 As in Paramount Communications, the court’s decision did not hinge on the
attorney’s behavior, which should have been dealt with in another way.
Opinions are an improper forum to eulogize the demise of courtesy in the legal profession
or to change attorneys’ behavior before the courts. There are other ways to discipline attorneys,
rather than taking them to task in a written opinion. A judge can warn bad lawyers in court, call
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them into chambers, order them to rewrite their briefs, or sanction them.320 Disrespecting lawyers
in the opinion detracts from the flow of the opinion. Personal attacks are immaterial to the issues
being decided.
Respect and courtesy should likewise exist among judges and extend to judges of other
courts and within the same court.321 An opinion that veers into a personal attack on another judge
is often deficient in legal analysis. Commonwealth v. Robin322 provides an example of a personal
attack that failed to reveal anything but the judge’s contempt for his colleagues. In Robin, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided that local governments cannot ban Henry Miller’s Tropic of
Cancer.323 The lone dissenter, Justice John Musmanno, was convinced that the book was obscene
and argued that the book’s ban should stand.324 In his opening paragraph, he wrote that his
colleagues had done more harm to the people of Pennsylvania than if they had let loose a
thousand rattlesnakes.325
People v. Arno326 is another example of a court’s lack of collegiality. There, the majority
of the California Court of Appeals wrote that it was necessary to “spell out” a response to the
dissent’s argument in an obscenity case.327 The majority wrote seven consecutively numbered
sentences, the first letters of which spelled out the word “S-C-H-M-U-C-K.”328 The message was
childish and delivered childishly.
Lack of respect also exists when appellate judges ridicule trial judges. This happens when
an appellate judge believes that the trial judge misinterpreted the law and the appellate judge
wants to let the trial judge know it. Also, the appellate judge may personally dislike the trial judge
and thus show a lack of respect.329 Both situations have the potential to create ethical problems. In
the first instance, the trial court’s decision should be reversed, but the appellate judge should
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avoid attacking the trial judge.330 In the second instance, appellate judges should consider
recusing themselves if they are incapable of deciding the case fairly because of their feelings
toward the trial judge.331 When an appellate judge attacks a trial judge, the litigant—who is not
responsible for the court’s internal conflicts and probably is unaware of the situation—will likely
conclude that the appellate judge decided the case based on the appellate judge’s feelings toward
the trial judge and not on the case’s merits.332
Judges should be mindful of the writings of Second Circuit Judge Calvert Magruder, who
wrote that judges “should approach [the] task of judicial review with a certain genuine humility”
and “never unnecessarily try to make a monkey of the judge in the court below.”333 His advice
applies to all involved in the judicial process, from other judges, to the attorneys, and to the
litigants. A judge must maintain a sense of common courtesy in order to dispense justice fairly
and ethically.
Popular Culture
Few laud the use of popular culture—literature, music, movies—in judicial opinions.
Opinions serve as precedent and are meant to build on prior cases and to provide a foundation for
the future. Planting an opinion in a particular time period by using popular culture takes away
from the opinion’s decorum and its ability to be a transitory piece of writing, moving from the
present to the future and connecting with the past.
Despite the need for opinions to be transitory, many impurist judges fall prey to inserting
popular culture, often by use of an analogy. Justice Harry Blackmun fell victim to that in Flood v.
Kuhn,334 in which the Supreme Court listed eighty-eight baseball greats and footnoted two
baseball verses in exempting baseball from antitrust laws. There is little doubt that injecting
popular culture into opinions makes some opinions easier to comprehend: they are easier to relate
to. The need for an opinion to be understood in the present, however, cannot overshadow the
opinion need for it to be understood in the future. References to current culture will end up
obscuring, rather than clarifying, the opinion. Consider the following passage from United States
v. Dumont:
The Grateful Dead play rock music. Their style, often called “acid rock” because it
mimics the effects some persons obtain after using LSD . . . is attractive to acidheads. Wherever the Dead appear, there is a demand for LSD in the audience.
Demand induces supply. Vendors follow the band around the country; law
enforcement officials follow the vendors.335
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Judge Frank H. Easterbrook’s opinion in Dumont, while exceptionally clever, illustrates that what
is understandable now will be incomprehensible fifty years from now.
Another reason to avoid using popular culture in opinions is to maintain the decorum of
the judicial system. The same reasons that counsel against using humor in opinions also suggest
that judges must limit, or better yet eradicate, any use of popular culture in their opinions. Using
popular culture has resulted in banal opinions that irrelevantly use lines from the Saturday Night
Live Wayne’s World skits and the 1992 movie, Wayne’s World—“In short, PRIME TIME’s most
bogus attempt at removal is ‘not worthy’ and the Defendants must ‘party on’ in state court.”336
Although mores and culture affect decision making,337 judges should be wary of showcasing their
erudition.338 Knowledge about popular culture is different from including it in a judicial
opinion.339 Including popular culture in a judicial opinion will not make the judge more popular or
the opinion more memorable for its legal conclusions.
Authority
To make judicial opinions more understandable to the public, impurists limit their
citations to legal precedent. The problem with using authority in impure opinions is the opposite
of using it in pure opinions. Impurists tend not to cite enough authority; purists tend to cite too
much. Fewer citations do not, however, correlate to less reliance on precedent. Precedent is an
integral part of a judicial opinion. A judge should always articulate the legal principle or test
underlying the court’s opinion. Often, the principle is established in past cases and simply
adopted in the current opinion. Written opinions, as opposed to oral opinions, have many
purposes, but the writer “should concentrate on a single goal—to write an opinion supported by
adequate authority that expresses the decision and rationale of the court in language and style that
generate confidence in the reader that justice has been fairly and effectively administered.”340
Judges must include just the right amount of authority in their opinions.
The most important thing the opinion must do is “state plainly the rule upon which the
decision proceeds. This is required in theory because the court’s function is to declare the law and
in practice because the bar is entitled to know exactly what rule it can follow in advising clients
and in trying cases.”341 In cases of first impression, judges should fashion the principle
themselves. Even so, all opinions should contain the sources from which the principle is derived.
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Although one school of thought contends that no case has precedential value because all
cases can be distinguished from each other,342 most believe in two coexisting doctrines of
precedent: (1) a narrow one to distinguish troublesome decisions; and (2) a broad one to analogize
cases to obtain a similar result.343 Judges should be aware of this dichotomy and balance the two
doctrines. They should fairly analogize and distinguish cases by affording each comparison the
same latitude and reliance.
The Supreme Court has long cautioned against excessive use of precedent: “[T]his court
in a very special sense is charged with the duty of construing and upholding the Constitution; . . .
it ever must be alert to see that a doubtful precedent be not extended by mere analogy to a
different case if the result will be to weaken or subvert what it conceives to be a principle of the
fundamental law of the land.”344 Moreover, the rules from the cases, not the cases themselves,
should be emphasized. According to former New York Chief Judge Cuthbert Pound, “judges too
often fail to recognize that the decision consists in what is done, not in what is said by the court in
doing it.”345 The same is true of legal fictions. Judge Robert Keeton advises: “Avoid legal
fictions, if possible. If you conclude that precedent requires you to invoke a legal fiction, explain
what you are doing and why.”346 Nevertheless, an opinion that is easy to understand might still
receive the public legitimacy it needs without making use of excess precedent. Impurists must
maintain legitimacy in the legal profession’s eyes. To ensure that an impure opinion maintains
legitimacy, impurists must adequately cite and rely on legal precedent.

VII. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN BOTH PURE AND IMPURE OPINIONS
Every judge, whether purist or impurist, must be aware of the ethical considerations that
arise regardless of the opinion’s style.
Persuasiveness
Opinions must combine honesty with persuasiveness. As Justice James D. Hopkins noted,
an “opinion . . . is an essay in persuasion.”347 Honesty and persuasiveness are not mutually
exclusive. The judge’s goal is to motivate the reader to agree with the opinion and to give the
reader grounds to do so. As Chief Judge Justice S. Kaye stated: “Writing opinions is a lot like
writing briefs. Both are, at bottom, efforts to persuade.”348 When an opinion is of relative first
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impression or deviates from precedent, an opinion writer may summarize the holding and then
“add[] a literary touch, stressing the policy or other persuasive considerations that call for this
conclusion.”349 To write persuasively yet ethically, judges must emphasize content, not the
writing itself.
Although judges should write persuasively, they must avoid writing polemics or writing
emotionally. As the Supreme Court of California wrote long ago, “An opinion is not a
controversial tract, much less a brief in reply to the counsel against whose views we decide. It is
merely a statement of conclusions, and of the principal reasons which have led us to them.”350
Some opinions “read[] like a lawyer’s brief, the worst possible style for a judicial opinion. It
discloses this kind of judge for what he is and ought not to be, an advocate.”351 Thus, “[a]n ethical
judge cannot be a polemicist.”352 Opinions are not pulpits or vessels to espouse personal beliefs.
Opinions are meant to be reasoned and solemn. It is through reasoning and solemnity that a
judge’s opinion becomes persuasive.
The Facts
The most important rule when drafting facts is to ensure that they are accurate. When
citing the facts, judges should not rely on the litigants’ statements of facts. Instead, judges should
verify the record. Litigants, who have an interest in the litigation, may shade meanings, and it is
unwise for a judge to adopt verbatim the findings of fact that the prevailing party sets forth in its
memorandum of law.353 Doing so makes it appear that the judge did not evaluate the facts
independently. A judge, moreover, should never adopt the facts presented by one side as the facts
of the case. Trial judges must engage in fact finding and resolve conflicts between different
versions of the facts presented by the testimony or in the litigants’ papers. If the court were to
consider only the facts one side presents, the court has already made its decision. When factual
conflicts arise, judges must do their best to state the full version of the facts by drawing from both
sides’ presentations of the facts.
Judges must also take care not to recite irrelevant facts. They serve no purpose except to
distract and confuse the reader. The goal, according to Professor Timothy P. Terrell, is to sift, not
regurgitate the facts. A poorly organized opinion, he explains,
is usually encumbered with loads of detail—every
fact presented seems to find its way into the court’s
description of the background of the legal dispute . .
. . Although the urge behind overinclusion is the
defendable one of thoroughness, a truly controlled
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presentation is also focused. That impression
requires a writer to sift the material of the document
rather than simply reproduce all of it and then try to
make sense of it all.354
Colorful but legally irrelevant facts, procedure, and evidence cloud an opinion. Including
immaterial facts trivializes the case and makes the reader believe that the immaterial facts
contributed to the outcome. A judge should articulate only the minimum facts necessary to
resolve the case.
Although the recitation of the facts must be accurate and complete, some information
should be omitted, like nonessential facts that impinge on the privacy rights of children or nonparties. Judges should also omit grossly graphic sexual scenarios, even when quoting someone
else, unless the scenario is critical to the opinion. In Lason v. State, an opinion this article will not
reprint, one Chief Justice of Florida did not follow that advice.355 Contrast that opinion with the
classic United States v. Thomas, which considered whether two Navy airmen were guilty of
attempting to rape a deceased woman they believed was drunk.356 The court wrote that “[t]he
evidence adduced at the trial presents a sordid and revolting picture which need not be discussed
in detail other than as necessary to decide the certified issues.”357 The court wisely omitted the
graphic details.
In addition to a complete, but succinct, rendition of the facts, judges must present a fair
version of the facts. Judges must construct and recount facts neutrally. If facts are presented
selectively and with characterization, the judge risks applying law to a situation that did not
occur.358 A “judge [who] consciously or unconsciously feels that to relate the full relevant truth
about a case would weaken the convincingness of a decision . . . ought to question that decision . .
. .”359 Presenting facts neutrally ensures that the facts are not skewed to “fit” the opinion’s
outcome. Law belongs to the judge, but facts belong to the litigants.
In an exceptional example, former Attorney General and Fifth Circuit Judge Griffin B.
Bell wrote that facts “must be stated as favorably as possible to the losing party . . . . The opinion
lacks judicial advocacy absent the best view of the facts for the losing party.”360 That is not the
conventional view. The opinion must address the facts the losing party presents to show the

354

Timothy P. Terrell, Organizing Clear Opinions: Beyond Logic to Coherence and Character, 38
JUDGES’ J., Spring 1999, at 4, 38.
355

See Lason v. State, 12 So. 2d 305, 305 (Fla. 1943).

356

See United States v. Thomas, 32 C.M.R. 278 (Ct. Mil. App. 1962).

357

Id. at 280.

358

Rhetoric of Results, supra note 131, at 1386; see also McGowan, supra note 29, at 554–55
(commenting that even if “intellectual honesty” does not compel judges to state facts neutrally, then they
should care enough to be neutral because their opinions serve as precedent).

359

Palmer, supra note 5, at 883.

360

Griffin B. Bell, Style in Judicial Writing, 15 J. PUB. L. 214, 216–17 (1966).

4826-9385-3952.1

52

losing side that its position has been considered.361 Thus, Justice Hopkins had “[o]ne cardinal
rule: do not omit facts which are stressed by the unsuccessful party or a doctrine which may be at
war with the ultimate disposition.”362 But once the opinion writer includes the facts in controversy
and states them fairly, the writer need not slant them toward the losing side.
Resolving conflicts in the facts is an opinion’s core function. Facts should not be used
merely to set the stage for the opinion. Judges are cognizant of relevant and controlling precedent.
Judges will naturally emphasize facts and distinguish the case from unhelpful precedent and
emphasize facts and analogize the case to helpful precedents.363 This connection between fact and
precedent is a compelling reason for a judge to present facts honestly. Judges must cogently set
out facts that also support the view not taken and explain why those counter-facts are not
determinative.364 Composing facts as a story is acceptable as long as that story is objective. A
well-reasoned opinion considers both sides of an argument and does not tailor facts to make a
decision seem more obvious than it actually is. The reason is that “[t]he one-sided approach
weakens the [opinion’s] analytical rigor.”365
The opinion in Steffan v. Perry366 illustrates the problem of presenting facts neutrally.
Joseph Steffan was a midshipman-in-training at the Naval Academy who admitted he was a
homosexual.367 He was given the choice of resigning from the Naval Academy or risk having the
Naval Academy’s superintendent recommend his discharge.368 Steffan decided to resign, but he
sued on constitutional grounds to overturn the regulations under which he would have been
discharged.369 The district court granted summary judgment, and the case was appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.370 The majority recounted the conflict between a
gay midshipman and Navy regulations in dry, bureaucratic language. The court took two pages to
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detail the Navy regulations disqualifying homosexuals from service before Steffan’s name is even
mentioned.371 In contrast, the dissent began by telling Steffan’s story by describing his
outstanding performance in the Naval Academy.372 The Navy regulations do not appear until
several pages into the dissenting opinion.373 The varied presentation of the facts lead the reader to
different outcomes. Each rendition justifies each outcome. This case, among many others,
illustrates that judges should first apply the law to neutral facts. Judges should not characterize
the facts to apply to the outcome of the case.
Judges must also present the facts fully because factual skewing and selectivity are not
obviously discernable to the reader. If a judge mischaracterizes precedent or misinterprets a
statute, the reader can go to the library to question the source. Case records, on the other hand, are
not readily available to the public.374 Furthermore, the likelihood of a case being reviewed on
appeal over a factual misstatement is rare. The higher the court, the greater the presumption that
any error in a decision is attributable to a legal error.375
The opinion should make explicit credibility determinations. A trial judge who hears
contested testimony should note that fact by using phrases like “the court finds that,” the court
“credits the testimony of,” and the court “afforded great weight to.”376 Appellate opinions should
recount the trial judge’s findings so that the opinion’s reasoning can be put in context. Few things
will frustrate a trial judge more than an appellate reversal that either does not recount the trial
findings of fact or which distorts the trial facts. Trial and appellate opinions should also cite the
record when referring to important facts. Because facts are central to opinions, presenting facts
honestly is vital to the opinion’s outcome and ensures that the public understands that the court
considered the case objectively.
A judge should also use concrete nouns and vigorous verbs, not abstractions or
conclusions, to recite relevant facts. Concreteness provides context and persuades the reader that
a result is correct. Being concrete means being specific; it means showing, not telling. As Judge
Patricia M. Wald advised, write in “Joe Six-Pack language. You would be surprised how often
abstract concepts conceal a failure to come to grips with the precise issues or facts in [a] case.”377
Writing non-abstractly is what separates great judges from merely competent ones: “The power of
vivid statement [is what] lifts an opinion by a Cardozo, a Holmes, a Learned Hand out of the
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swarm of humdrum, often numbing, judicial opinions, rivets attention, crystallizes relevant
concerns and considerations, provokes thought.”378
The Claim or Issue Definition
One of the most important aspects of opinion writing is one of the most ineffable. How a
judge defines a claim or issue determines how the judge will decide the claim or issue—and
whether the reader will agree with that opinion. As Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote, “In law . . .
the right answer usually depends on putting the right question.”379 The right question will make
the reader believe that the judge gave the right answer.
In United States v. Morrison,380 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the
Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”). The dissent defined the issue as whether society needs
to use the federal courts to compensate victims of gender-based violence to punish its
perpetrators. The majority, which found VAWA unconstitutional, defined the issue as the extent
to which the Constitution’s Commerce Clause permits federal law to be imposed on the states.
Both the majority’s and the dissent’s issue framing makes the reader agree with their assessment.
Their issue framing suggests that how you come out depends on how you came in.
Part of framing an issue or claim may result in a judge’s resolving a case on a point of law
neither side argued. The New York Court of Appeals has offered a famous justification for
considering issues sua sponte: “To say that appellate courts must decide between two
constructions proffered by the parties, no matter how erroneous both may be, would be to render
automatons of judges, forcing them merely to register their reactions to the arguments of counsel
at the trial level.”381
Some great cases have been decided sua sponte, including Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins.382 Deciding cases sua sponte, however, leads to bitterness among counsel and
sometimes even within the court.383 If the litigants do not address a dispositive issue, the judge
should consider asking counsel before oral argument to brief or orally argue the issue rather than
making a sua sponte decision. This technique is consistent with due process, causes little delay,
and saves the majority from encountering dissents and considering motions to reargue.384 Doing
so also leads to better, more ethical opinions. In the American adversary system of justice,
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especially at the appellate level, decisions are often only as good as the lawyers who appear
before the court.
Ordering Claims and Issues and the Rules Within Issues
An opinion must resolve claims or issues in a logical order. But opinions need follow no
single logical order. Every case is different. Below are some guidelines.
Judges should be wary of deciding claims and issues in the order the litigants present
them. Advocates are trained to start with the argument that has the greatest likelihood of success.
Judicial-opinion writers have a different agenda. Moreover, “slavishly following the briefs, point
by point . . . makes the opinion seem mechanical.”385 Adopting the litigants’ organization can
make it appear that the court did not exercise independent judgment:
A quick, and therefore seductively attractive, way to organize any opinion is to let
the parties supply its pieces and order . . . . Reasoning by reacting could be
effective in certain circumstances, but more often it is a sign of judicial despair or
fatigue. Some judges seem to believe that this form of organization is the only
method for the court to demonstrate appropriate respect for the arguments of the
litigants, carefully responding in turn to each side’s points. But respect of this sort
does not require the judge to concede the structure of his or her opinion to the
parties. Respect is owed not just to the parties, but to the court as well.386
The goal is for judges to decide claims and issues in a manner befitting the case and the court.
Judges should decide threshold issues before deciding the merits. A threshold issue is
often a procedural issue, such as whether the court has jurisdiction to consider the merits.
Sometimes a threshold issue is substantive, such as a statute of limitations question. Depending
on the ruling, threshold issues can be dispositive.
After threshold issues are resolved, judges should put essential things first, and resolve the
large claims or issues before deciding less significant matters. One technique, from the pure
opinion, is to use topic sentences and thesis paragraphs to tell readers, up front, how the court will
resolve the issue. This holds true in appellate opinion writing: “like the opening paragraph of the
opinion, the initial paragraph presenting a point of error may be brought to a close by revealing
the appellate court’s conclusion as to whether the trial court reversibly erred on that point.”387
This pure-style writing rule also applies to opinions that consider multiple issues. If all the claims
are equally large, the judge should resolve the claim that most affects the litigation. Thus, in a
criminal appeal in which a defendant seeks a new trial or, in the alternative, a reduced jail
sentence, the appellate court should first decide whether to grant a new trial. If the court grants a
new trial, it should not consider the request for a reduced sentence.388
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A judge must also move logically through statutory or common-law tests. Often a decision
depends on whether a litigant satisfied a multi-factor test enumerated in a statute or a seminal
case. A writer must resolve the claim in the sequence in which the statute or case laid out the
factors. The reader will understand relationships more easily that way, and the writer will avoid
awkward cross-referencing. Deciding claims and issues in the order in which they arose facilitates
understanding if the claims and issues arose chronologically.
Everything else being equal, judges should resolve issues by a hierarchy of authority:
constitutional questions first, then statutory questions, then common-law questions.
Innuendo
An opinion should rely on facts and law—no room exists for assumptions or innuendos.
Litigants are defenseless against the opinion writer who imputes impure motives. An example of
moralistic assumption-making:
At the time of the trial plaintiff was 66, and the defendant 42, years of age.
Defendant had been twice married, once widowed and once divorced. Plaintiff had
been twice married and twice divorced—each time at the suit of his wife. He had
subsequently been defendant in an action for breach of promise, and had sought
the graces of other women with a fervor not altogether Platonic. The parties did
not drift into love unconsciously, as sometimes happens with younger and less
experienced couples. Both knew from the start exactly what they wanted. She
wanted a husband with money—or money with a husband. He wanted a wife to
adorn his house and insure that conjugal felicity of which fate and the divorce
court had repeatedly deprived him.389
If the court’s assumptions are incorrect, a litigant becomes the innuendo’s victim. Innuendo
improperly lowers the court’s opinion to impressions rather than law.
Candor
Candor is an essential component of a judicial opinion. The expectation that litigants
candidly present the facts and law before the court requires a similar judicial response. The
requirement that judges give reasons for their decisions serves a vital function: constraining the
judiciary’s exercise of power.390 Some argue that the reasoning in judicial opinions is a post hoc
rationalization of a decision determined by instinct or hunch.391 Even if a judge arrives at an
outcome instinctively, reasoning must underlie the judge’s decision.392 Candor in judicial

be resolved correctly or so that an error will not be repeated. Guidance for a retrial “not only simplif[ies]
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opinions helps readers comprehend the outcome that the judge determined. Judges like Robert H.
Jackson, John Marshall Harlan, and Henry J. Friendly are known for the candor they displayed in
acknowledging the difficulties of decision-making and the strength of competing arguments.393
Candor does not automatically ensure that judges will be lauded for their intelligence, style, and
craft. But lack of candor, when discovered, will reveal a lack of integrity.394
Candor has its limits, however. The judicial opinion should never describe the judge’s
effort to render a fair decision. The public and the litigants presume that the courts are fair. Judge
Posner explained: “Many judges voting to uphold statutes they personally dislike will say so, to
make themselves sound more impartial. This is an ethical appeal, but of a somewhat crass and
self-congratulatory sort.”395 To declare the great pains the court endured to achieve fairness is
unnecessary and defensive: “[T]o ‘tell all,’ with complete and unmitigated candor, is not always a
virtue in judicial opinions or elsewhere. Restraint may be a virtue, too, for reasons sometimes of
decency and sometimes of wise planning.”396 The circumstances surrounding the decision-making
procedure will not make the opinion any more or less correct than the reasoning the judge uses.
Many decisions are hard to make, but judges should not describe how hard it was to make the
decision.
Judges should avoid revealing their personal thoughts about the issues in the case in the
guise of candor. Composing an opinion with unmitigated candor is not always a virtue in judicial
opinions or elsewhere. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes made an ethical appeal to the reader in
Lochner v. New York when he wrote: “The case is decided upon an economic theory which a
large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that
theory, I should study it further and long before making up my mind.”397
Justice Holmes’s point was to show how deliberative he was when faced with an
important decision. A judge is presumed to deliberate on each decision carefully. Judges who
state how difficult the decision-rendering process was, in an effort to convince the reader of the
judge’s hard work and diligence, more often than not leave their readers unpersuaded.
Similarly, judges should not explain to the reader the amount of research that went into
deciding the case. To do so forces the reader to believe the court because of all the work the court
put into the opinion. The court should discuss only the results of its legal research. The court will
illustrate through written analysis that it worked hard in research and writing. Judges often
congratulate themselves for conducting “a through review of the record,” “exhaustive research,”
CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929) (“[A]fter canvassing all the available material at my command, and duly
cogitating upon it, [I] give my imagination play, and brooding over the cause, wait for the feeling, the
hunch—that intuitive flash of understanding which makes the jump-spark connection between question
and decision . . . .”)).
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and “a close reading” of the papers. Judges sometimes tell their readers that they engaged in
“careful deliberation” and engaged in a “complete review” of the record. Expressions of candor
should be eliminated.
Do judges use highlighting strategies to assure skeptical readers that they spend their time
deciding cases rather than at the golf course? Or do judges use these strategies out of habit? Either
way, verbiage that tells a reader that a judge is honest, smart, deliberate, detail-oriented, impartial,
articulate, or empathetic has a negative effect.
Judges who tell people that they are fair are fair game for those who would argue that they
are unfair. That happened in Gideon v. Wainwright, in which Justice Hugo Black, with
understated sarcasm, noted in the opinion’s first paragraph that the Florida “Supreme Court,
‘upon consideration thereof’ but without an opinion, denied all relief” to the defendant, who had
argued that “‘[t]he United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be represented by
Counsel.’”398
Sometimes the judge has a hunch or intuition about how an opinion should come out.
Although a hunch may play a role in the decision’s outcome—if the judge’s research warrants
it—the opinion must be justified.399 Judges usually do not have the luxury of time to research and
write thoroughly. Judges who must issue an opinion before being convinced of its correctness
should be encouraged by the following observation:
An opinion can withstand any infirmity except vacillation. An umpire who
promptly, resolutely, and incorrectly calls a strike when the ball was wide by a
mile doesn’t harm the game of baseball; the national pastime could be ruined,
however, by an umpire who massaged his chin, then scratched his head, and finally
confessed that since he wasn’t sure whether it was a ball or a strike, he might as
well call it a two-base hit.400
Judges are encouraged to bring finality to disputes even if they are not always certain of the
decision. Thus, being candid may, in exceptional cases, require a “tentative” conclusion.401
Opinion writers who render tentative conclusions are said to be dubitante. A judge who is
tentative expresses findings of fact and conclusions of law with reservations. A tentative opinion
is a draft opinion issued by a judge prior to the final decision. Many judges are uncomfortable
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with the idea of issuing tentative opinions: “tentative opinions [are] as welcome[] as a porcupine
at a dog show.”402
Judges have a difficult time striking a balance between being honest and giving too much
information. Even the most beloved judges have, on occasion, expressed too much candor. For
example, in People v. Davis, New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Charles D. Breitel in
dissent remarked:
Speaking for myself alone among the dissenters I find capital punishment
repulsive, unproven to be an effective deterrent (of which the James case [] is
illustrative), unworthy of a civilized society (except perhaps for deserters in time
of war) because of the occasion of mistakes and changes in social values as to
what are mitigating circumstances, and the brutalizing of all those who participate
directly or indirectly in its infliction.403
Several factors can test a judge’s limits to candor: precedents, collegiality, litigants, lawyers,
personalities, and politics. Discussing life-and-death struggles over euthanasia and jury
nullification, former Yale Law School Dean (and now Second Circuit Judge) Guido Calabresi
argued that judges should dissemble when values conflict and the options are tragic.404 New York
University and Cambridge University joint-appointee Ronald Dworkin, perhaps today’s leading
philosopher of jurisprudence, believes that when legal and moral rights conflict and a judge is
faced with making a difficult moral decision, sometimes the judge should lie for the high goal of
rendering a just decision.405
Tone and Temperament
Judges should always maintain a professional, neutral tone. Regardless of the judge’s
personal feelings, the tone should stay restrained, patient, dignified, and courteous. As Professor
Terrell explains, “style has to do with the relationship of writer to reader, a relationship that can
be, for example, authoritarian or collegial or deferential.”406 On the other hand, the “tone of an
opinion . . . depends for its legitimacy on autocratic claims to professional authority, or, less
arrogantly, on invocations of reasoned discourse, or, even more familiarly, on appeals to simple
humanity or fundamental values.”407 The Model Rules of Judicial Conduct requires judges to
402
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maintain neutrality:
Expressions of bias or prejudice by a judge . . . may cast reasonable
doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially as a judge.
Expressions which may do so include jokes or other remarks
demeaning individuals on the basis of their race, sex, religion,
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic
status.408
To maintain the professional tone expected in an opinion, judges must remain impartial.
To avoid sounding antagonistic, the court should not address every point a losing party
raises. Addressing each point will “remove the decision from the really vital issues of each case
and . . . transform the opinion into a list of rulings on academic legal assertions.”409 Excessively
dwelling on every one of the losing side’s arguments also dooms the opinion to a lengthy
dissertation on irrelevant topics. It is critical for judges to explain why the court got it right, not
why the loser got it wrong.410 The losing side’s relevant arguments must be addressed and never
dismissed out of hand.411 In doing so, the court must treat all litigants with dignity.412
Judges must also ensure that their tone is restrained. Judges must be careful to make sure
that their opinion is patient, not arrogant, flippant, or influenced by provocation. At the same
time, judges must maintain a dignified tone while never obscuring the real reason for the
decision.413
United States Supreme Court Justices and others have not always maintained a dignified
tone. In expressing scornful views about homosexuals, women’s rights, immigrants, or victims of
sexual harassment, these judges have allowed their readers to believe that their scorn motivated
their legal rulings. Below are examples:
• Relying on values expressed from Roman law to Blackstone to uphold a statute
that criminalized sex between consenting adults in private, concurring Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger wrote: “To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is
somehow protected as a fundamental right would . . . cast aside millennia of moral
teaching.”414
• A majority of the Court forbade gender-based discrimination in peremptory jury
408
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challenges.415 The dissenting Justices noted that the majority’s decision “is an
inspiring demonstration of how thoroughly up-to-date and right-thinking we
Justices are in matters pertaining to the sexes (or, as the Court would have it, the
genders) and how sternly we disapprove the male chauvinistic attitudes of our
predecessors.”416
• A concurring Justice believed that the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA)
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint. According to the concurrence,
It takes a particularly high degree of chutzpah for the NEA to
contradict this proposition, since the agency itself
discriminates—and is required by law to discriminate—in favor of
artistic (as opposed to scientific, or political, or theological)
expression. Not all the common folk, or even all great minds, for
that matter, think that is a good idea. In 1800, when John Marshall
told John Adams that a recent immigration of Frenchmen would
include talented artists, “Adams denounced all Frenchmen, but
most especially ‘schoolmasters, painters, poets, & C.’ He warned
Marshall that the fine arts were like germs that infected healthy
constitutions.”417
• At trial, bank employees asserted that a bank vice president caused them
emotional distress by falsely accusing them of making “dial-a-porn” toll calls from
the bank’s telephones.418 The vice president forced the employees to listen, with
others present, to a recording of a call that “presented a woman having sexual
relations with a man, and telling him how she wanted him to do it.”419 Deciding
that the plaintiffs’ claims were untimely, the court wrote: “Enforced exposure to
salacious dialogue notwithstanding, the record establishes no justification for us to
rescue these six suitors from their self-dug hole. In calling upon us for extrication,
plaintiffs have dialed yet another wrong number.”420
Lamentably, in these famous and infamous opinions, what remains with the reader is not the
outcome of the case but the tone in which the outcome was delivered. The tone in these cases says
more about the decision-making process than about the law. These passages suggest a bias in the
decision-making process.
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Modesty, Humanity, and Humility
People who know judges agree that “there have sometimes been martinets upon the bench
as there have also been pompous wielders of authority who have used the paraphernalia of power
in support of what they called their dignity.”421 Judicial modesty is hard to master, but modesty
must be mastered: “Most writers are beset by the healthy worry that they won’t be read. The
writer-judge suffers no such humbling agony. For a time at least, whatever the judge writes is
law; readership not always meek but guaranteed. A tendency to write as though the whole world
were waiting. Can pompousness be far away?”422 But judicial pomposity is a wasted effort. Most
people care about things more important than judicial opinions: “[F]ew citizens will sit down with
a volume of our opinions, yet many will spend days on jury duty, seek an order of protection in
family court, or live in a neighborhood where they see the effects of the criminal justice system’s
revolving door.”423 And pomposity in opinion writing violates the function of justice, which is to
offer just solutions, not brilliant opinions, as Piero Calamandrei wrote in his Eulogy of Judges424:
In the hope of seeing their “brilliant” opinions published in the law
reports or having them create favorable impressions when
promotion is being considered, there is a danger that some judges
will treat the decisions as the point of departure for a brilliant essay
rather than a bridge of passage to the just conclusion — the true
function of the judicial process. The judge who is intent only upon
presenting a casual reader with the delight of a literary masterpiece,
instead of offering a just solution to the suffering of the parties, fails
to comprehend the holy function of justice.
....
[T]he best judge is the one in whom a ready humanity prevails over
cautious intellectualism. A sense of justice, the innate quality
bearing no relation to acquired legal techniques, which enables the
judge after hearing the facts to feel which party is right, is as
necessary to him as a good ear is to a musician; for, if this quality is
wanting, no degree of intellectual pre-eminence will afford
adequate compensation.
Judicial opinions are not meant to be literary masterpieces. Nor are they meant as vehicles to
display a judge’s intelligence. Whatever style a judge chooses to use in a judicial opinion,
modesty is essential.
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For an example of an immodest opinion, see Bianchi v. Savage.425 Although the landlordtenant issue in the case had minimal legal significance, the court treated the issue as if civilization
itself depended on the court’s ruling. The judge’s lack of modesty is endless: (1) the use of the
royal “we” and “us”; (2) the capitals; (3) the italics; (4) the italicized capitals; (5) the adverbs and
adjectives (“grossly,” “unjust”); (6) the Latin in the text (“contra”); (7) the metadiscourse (“we
are aware that”); (8) the exclamation mark; (9) the self-congratulatory phrases (not being
“blindly” bound by another court; (10) saving time and money; (11) exalting substance over
form; (12) the “torch has been passed to us”; (13) “a beginning must be made”; (14) “challenged
to tread” on an issue novel to the court; (15) “judicial courage”; (16) the (inaccurate) mention that
the case is “of very first impression”; (17) the pretense at modesty (that some have “intellects far
greater than ours”); and (18) the excessive degree of confidence in the appellate process
(“Appellate Courts will reverse us if we err”):.
We are aware this result is contra to 353 Realty Corp. v. Disla, 81 Misc.2d 68, 364
N.Y.S.2d 676 (1974), but we do not feel bound as a matter of Stare Decisis
doctrines to blindly follow the determination of the Civil Court of the City of New
York, in the case at bar. To do so here would work a grossly unfair and unjust
result on the parties because they would be right back in court litigating what is
really only ONE KEY ISSUE in this matter. What a waste of time, talent, money,
energy, and exercise in futility that would be all around!
REASONING:
A. This Court is now and always will be concerned with EXALTING
SUBSTANCE OVER FORM, and LAW OVER PROCEDURE.
....
C. The Substantive issue before us is one of very first impression in the State of
New York. We must not lack the judicial courage to plunge in where intellects far
greater than ours have not yet been challenged to tread. It is questionable courage
in any event because Appellate Courts will reverse us if we err. A beginning must
be made and the torch has been passed to us.426
In Bianchi, the court made it appear as if it had gone to a place where no one had gone before.
Compare the Bianchi court’s treatment with Justice Holmes’s more modest opening sentence in
Haddock v. Haddock: “I do not suppose that civilization will come to an end whichever way this
case is decided.”427
Judicial pomposity has been the subject of much satire. Mortimer Levitan, in a remarkable
piece of legal satire, commented on modesty on the bench.428 Here is an excerpt from his master-
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work:
Courts, in order to make their products more acceptable, must be endowed with
superhuman knowledge, infinite wisdom and virtual infallibility. Everybody, then,
should be indoctrinated with the idea that judges possess those supernatural
qualities—everybody, that is, except the judges themselves. A judge should always
remain sufficiently human so that if he overhears a whispered conversation about a
divine figure in a black robe, he’d know instantly that the subject under discussion
was not the judiciary.
Another favorite, from Iolanthe, is the Lord Chancellor, who thought highly of himself when he
said:429
The Law is the true embodiment
Of everything that’s excellent.
It has no kind of fault or flaw,
And I, my Lords, embody the Law.
Judges, however, have faults and flaws. At times they are neither excellent nor the true
embodiment of the law, although they may think so.
Scholarship is humility, not the vanity press. Trial judges should cite their own opinions
only if they must. On the other hand, appellate courts should quote from and cite their own
opinions to show adherence to precedent. T.S. Eliot was right: “Humility is the most difficult of
all virtues to achieve.”430 As former Second Circuit Judge Harold R. Medina wrote, “we cannot
deny the fact that a judge is almost of necessity surrounded by people who keep telling him what
a wonderful fellow he is. And if he once begins to believe it, he is a lost soul.”431
Dissents and Concurrences
Unanimity in the law promotes collegiality, reduces the number of motions for
reargument, and promotes public confidence.432 Concurrences and dissents should not be written
unless a judge has something significant to add beyond personal dissatisfaction.433 A concurrence
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agrees with the result but for different reasons. Oftentimes concurrences are written to obtain a
plurality.434 Although concurrences may be helpful, unexplained concurrences have little utility
and end up frustrating litigants and readers.435
When judges write dissents, they object to the result reached in the case. The dissent is
written for the future in the hope that another court, perhaps an appellate court, will agree with the
reasoning: “A sense of urgency and of impending doom is almost a sine qua non of the dissenting
voice.”436 Dissents fail when they are overly collegial and when the dissent becomes a method of
judicial jabbing.437 The Model Code, Canon 19, at one time urged that dissents be limited, “except
in case[s] of conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental principal.”438 Although Canon 19
is no longer in the Model Code, its message continues to be relevant.
Dissenting and concurring opinions should offer explanations to justify their use. A
dissent or concurrence can have a powerful effect on the court’s opinion, and the availability of
concurrences and dissents limits judicial advocacy by judges in the majority, fosters judicial
accountability, and provides a safety valve for judges to blow off steam.439
Boilerplate Language
Judges must write quickly to keep up with ever-increasing caseloads. However, using
boilerplate to speed up the opinion-writing process does not solve the problem: “The virtue of
[boilerplate] is also their vice. They are a cheap, quick substitute for knowledge and independent
thinking.”440
Judges should avoid the temptation write boilerplate decisions even when the case
involves a basic, routine issue. Boilerplate is dangerous if a judge uses boilerplate language from
a previous decision or takes language from hallmark cases. The decision to use boilerplate
language raises the opinion’s form over its substance. A judge who uses boilerplate will fail to do
justice in the case; the judge should write a reasoned decision based on the specific facts before
the court. The purpose, audience and style of each judicial opinion may be different. But judges
should not conform each case and set of facts to boilerplate decisions: “High-volume courts may
434
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wish to codify patterns for efficiency’s sake, but courts should carefully examine standardized
language and other fixed language for aim, audience, and style before committing to them.”441
Judges should also refrain from relying on language from well-trod cases. The court may
be faced with distinguishable facts or novel issues, and judicial efficiency might be perverted
when judges use boilerplate. A judge who uses boilerplate might ignore important facts or issues
that do not fit within the boilerplate opinion’s four corners. It is unacceptable for a judge to force
a case into a boilerplate decision. A judge’s job is to maintain the integrity and vitality of the law.
Cookie-cutter decisions leave readers with a sour taste.
Clean-Up Phrases
Clean-up phrases may suffice in most civil cases. Clean-up phrases include:
“This court has considered appellant’s remaining contentions and concludes that
they lack merit [or that no extended discussion is necessary].”
“Because we dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, we need
not reach defendant’s contention that the trial court’s jury charge was erroneous.”
In criminal cases, Judge Aldisert recommends that “whether on direct appeal or collateral
review—the better practice is to list the issues that have been rejected by the court without having
been discussed. This is important in order for a record to be kept of what the court has considered,
no matter how frivolous the contention.”442 Many trial and appellate courts enumerate rejected
issues or claims. This is beneficial for several reasons: It aids state trial and appellate courts
assess motions; it helps federal courts on habeas corpus review; and it satisfies defendants,
counsel, and the public that the court addressed all the litigants’ contentions. Listing rejected
claims takes but a few extra minutes and will not detract from an otherwise elegant opinion.
Timeliness
Judges have a duty to issue timely decisions. A judge who ignores or fails to issue a
timely decision may face disciplinary sanctions or at least administrative correction. One New
York State Supreme Court justice faced disciplinary sanctions when he delayed issuing decisions
in eight cases.443 The delays ranged from seven months in a tort case to over nine years in an
admiralty case. The litigants were forced to commence proceedings to compel the justice to issue
the decisions in four of those cases. The New York Court of Appeals noted that the justice’s
“handling of the cases” showed his “serious administrative failings.”444 But the court, over a
strong dissent, did not discipline the judge. According to the court, the judge’s actions were “not
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the kind of derelictions commonly associated with misconduct warranting formal penalties.”445 It
held that there was “no persistent or deliberate neglect of his judicial duties rising to the level of
misconduct.”446
It is hard to fathom why the court did not find that the justice’s actions rose to the level of
“persistent or deliberate” neglect of judicial duties. One reason for the court’s decision might
have been that the court sympathized with the justice’s predicament and took into account his
experience and commitment. Most believe, however, that judges who fail to issue timely
decisions act unethically, and numerous courts have disagreed with the Greenfield decision.447
Judges must, according to Model Canon 3 A(5), dispose of all court business promptly. Late
justice is injustice.

VIII. THE ROLE OF LAW CLERKS
Using law clerks to research and draft opinions is a necessity for all judges with clogged
calendars.448 Most opinion writing has evolved into a process between the judge and the law
clerk.449 Using law clerks to draft opinions is not unethical, but the judge’s voice and reasoning
must resonate through the opinion. The law clerk should not be the arbiter and the judge merely
the overseer.450
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone allowed his law clerk, Louis Lusky, to write the most
significant footnote in Supreme Court history.451 Footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Products, which created the strict-scrutiny standard in constitutional jurisprudence, is a startling
example of how law clerks can mold the law.
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In his book about the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice Rehnquist explained the
contributions his law clerks made to the opinion writing process.452 He told his law clerk how he
voted in conference with the other Justices and then assigned the clerk the task of writing the
opinion’s first draft.453 The Chief Justice then edited the opinion with the final say on the
opinion’s content and language.454 This process is common among appellate judges. Modern law
clerks have the power to shape an opinion because they create the first draft.455 With the increased
responsibility law clerks bear, some see modern judges as administrators who manage judicial
work through their law clerks rather than as traditional jurists.456
Opinion writing is collaborative.457 Whether the law clerk prepares the initial drafts or the
final edits, the entire adjudicative function and decision-making process must remain exclusively
with the judge. To maintain control, judges, when using law clerks, should keep in mind the
following principles. First, judges should always make sure that they discuss the opinion with the
clerk and that the clerk is familiar with the facts underlying the opinion.458 A judge who does not
keep close tabs on the opinion will be unable to gauge whether the opinion is written correctly.
The judge will be able to catch only the most glaring errors.459 Second, judges should listen to
their clerk’s feedback and take the clerk’s views seriously.460 Listening to the clerk helps
strengthen the relationship between the judge and the clerk and encourages an open discussion of
the issues involved in the opinion.461 Third, notwithstanding the clerk’s involvement, “[e]very
word and citation must be the authentic expression of the judge’s thoughts, views, and
findings.”462
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Although the opinion must be the judge’s work, it is important for judges who rely on
their clerks to keep an open mind and communicate with the clerk. The clerk might not have the
judge’s experience, but a clerk is doing the research and has greater familiarity than the judge
with the facts and law.463 Keeping an open dialogue with the clerk ensures that the clerk is free to
express views about the opinion, even when the clerk disagrees with the judge.464 If the clerk
happens to be correct, then an open relationship will foster a better opinion. Along similar lines, a
judge should not decide the outcome of a case and then force the clerk to write within the
confines of that outcome.465 The judge must be flexible if it turns out that precedent contradicts
the judge’s initial thoughts. Judges should delegate work to their clerks if necessary, but the
delegation should not result in the clerk’s usurping the judge’s job.466 Instead, judges should stay
abreast of the opinion writing. Litigants, lawyers, and the public expect judges, not clerks, to
decide cases.
To avoid the appearance that another individual created the work, a judge should not
credit the law clerk’s work on an opinion.467 In New York, the Law Reporting Bureau has put into
effect the Court of Appeals’s policy forbidding judges from thanking their law clerks or interns in
opinions. The Law Reporting Bureau will not print any part of an opinion that acknowledges the
contributions of a law clerk or intern. Before this rule went into effect, judges lauded the clerks’
and interns’ contributions. For example, in Wolkoff v. Church of St. Rita, the judge thanked his
summer intern for the contributions he made to the opinion: “The hard work, thorough research
and scholarship of Edward Larsen, New York Law School Intern participating in the Richmond
County Bar Association Summer Intern Program, is gratefully acknowledged and in large
measure credited in the formation of this opinion. Mr. Larsen has the sincere thanks of this
Court.”468 Today, this type of praise could pass for a letter of recommendation.
The opinion in Acceptance Insurance Company v. Schafner469 is an even more extreme
example. There, the judge’s contribution to an opinion issued under his name was a footnote
stating that the opinion was “prepared by William G. Sommerville, III, Law Clerk, in which the
Court fully concurs.”470 The example is extreme in that the judge acknowledges that he wrote
only the footnote to the opinion and that the remaining portion of the opinion was the law clerk’s
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handiwork. This creates a topsy-turvy world—one in which the clerk has been elevated to the
position of judge and the judge has been lowered to the position of clerk.
The process borders on the unethical when judges abdicate their judicial responsibility and
leave the entire decision in the law clerk’s hands either by failing to follow up on the law clerk’s
research or by failing to edit the law clerk’s writing. The judge at this point hands the reigns to an
unelected and unappointed court employee. Judges who give the entire duty of writing opinions to
law clerks harm the litigants, the legal profession, the public, and themselves.
A judge may use a law clerk, student intern or extern, special master, or referee to assist in
opinion writing. A judge may not, however, use an outside expert for that purpose. In In re
Fuchsberg, an associate judge of the New York Court of Appeals hired law professors to write his
opinions.471 The judges of the Court of Appeals, who reviewed their colleague’s disciplinary
complaint, rejected the judge’s “explanation that he looked upon the law professors he consulted
as ‘ad hoc’ law clerks.”472 The court censured the judge and noted that “[t]he substantial
incorporation of outside experts’ language in a Judge’s opinion suggests, without more, that the
expert is influencing the decision-making process. To that extent such a practice impairs the
public’s confidence in the independence and integrity of the judiciary . . . .”473 The court
expressed its hopes that the judge, and others similarly situated, would attend to the ethical
canons in the future “and act in a way that does not cast the slightest doubt on the independence,
impartiality, and integrity of the judiciary.”474
In another disciplinary proceeding, a Circuit Court Judge from Milwaukee County hired a
law professor and friend to write thirty-two opinions. The law professor had extensive discussions
with the judge about dispositive motions and assisted the judge in drafting opinions. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin found that the judge violated the former Code of Judicial Ethics rule
prohibiting a judge from having private communications designed to influence the judge's
decision.475 The court also found that the judge engaged in “ex parte communications.”476
Ultimately, the court found that Judge Tesmer deserved a reprimand for her actions. Judges who
engage in similar conduct can be reprimanded, censured, or removed from office.

IX. CONCLUSION: WRITING IN THE MIDDLE
Is it more ethical to write in the pure style or the impure style? Where does the answer lie?
Purists include Justices Brandeis, Brennan, Cardozo, Frankfurter, and the second Harlan.477
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Impurists include Justices Black, Douglas, Learned Hand, Holmes, and Jackson.478 Although
individual tastes differ, one would be hard-pressed to say that any of these judges could not write
well. Thus, like many things, the answer lies in the middle. The most effective opinions will
incorporate ideas from both the pure and impure styles: an effective, ethical opinion will
incorporate the techniques that make impure opinion readable as well as the techniques that make
pure opinions detailed sources of legal information.
Judicial opinions should be the result of a dynamic and disciplined interplay of conceptual
and empirical analysis.479 Nothing breeds more disrespect and contempt for the judiciary than the
appearance that a court treated one litigant differently from the other.480 At a basic level, an
opinion must convince its audience—the judiciary, lawyers, or the public—that the judge
considered all points of view and “that opposing evaluations of the case have been understood
and seriously weighed.”481
Much of the practice of law involves communicating with peers, albeit in a formalized
manner.482 Judges participate in this dialogue through the words in their opinions. The role of a
judicial opinion extends beyond merely functioning as precedent. Judicial opinions now serve as
teaching tools for students and lawyers, as primers on law, and as guides for future action. But
some ideals have not changed. As stated over 200 years ago, writing opinions “will ensure a
careful examination of the cases, and result in well considered opinions, because they must come
before the jurists of the country and be subjected to the severest criticism.”483
To be ethical, judicial opinions must live up to high moral standards. Judges must promote
the image of fairness and integrity in the judicial system. Judges must be free of bias and the
appearance of bias, treat attorneys and litigants with dignity and respect, and act as role models
for the legal profession. Judges should follow these principles in all aspects of their professional
lives, especially when writing judicial opinions. Judges must never lose perspective on their place
in the larger judicial system. From day to day, a judge might be pressured, angry with the lawyers
or litigants, or confronted with an unusual or humorous case. In the process of writing opinions
and deciding cases, it is possible to develop bad habits or to forget that a judicial opinion is meant
to do more than just resolve a controversy for those before the court in that moment of time. Each
judicial opinion contributes to the body of the common law and in some way—small or
large—affects the public perception of the judiciary. When judges write, they must have ethics on
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their minds. Doing so improves the judiciary, the legal profession, and the public’s perception of
the judicial branch.
Crafting a judicial opinion that is respectful, well-reasoned, factually honest, and carefully
written encourages public respect for the judiciary and acceptance of its opinions.484 Only the
“kind of law that conforms to the ideals of democracy”485 will contribute to society’s growth.
Each judge assumes the responsibility to ensure that justice is dispensed. For, “[i]f the function of
opinions is to inform or to persuade, judges have failed unless their words actually convey their
ideas to their readers.”486 To fulfill this role effectively, judges must be able to explain where
justice lies.

484

Wanderer, supra note 240, at 51.

485

See id. (quoting Palmer, supra note 5, at 885).

486

Wanderer, supra note 240, at 61.

4826-9385-3952.1

73

